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Goodwill, for financial accounting purposes, is an intangible asset on the balance
sheet that represents the excess of the amount paid for an acquired entity over the net fair
value of the assets acquired. The Financial Accounting Standards Board has recently
issued a new mandate. This new guideline eliminates annual amortization of goodwill
and requires annual valuation for potential goodwill impairment and consequent
writedown. Determining the amount of impairment requires management estimation,
thus, allowing managerial discretion in developing the impairment amounts. Managerial
discretion may then be used to manage earnings.
Earnings management occurs when managers exercise their professional
judgment in financial reporting to manipulate earnings. Prior literature documents that
managers have strong motivations to manage earnings. Managers sometimes respond to
these motivations by managing earnings to exceed key earnings thresholds. The new

goodwill guideline might be used as an earnings management tool. Thus, this
dissertation examines whether earnings management results from the judgmental latitude
allowed in estimating goodwill when earnings will otherwise just miss key earnings
benchmarks.
Specifically, this study tests goodwill impairment writedowns in a cross-sectional
distributional analysis for the year 2002, the first year following the effective date of the
new goodwill standards. The sample is taken from the financial information of publiclytraded companies tracked in the Compustat and CRSP databases. To identify firms that
are likely to have managed earnings to exceed key benchmarks, earnings per share, both
before and after goodwill impairment writedowns, is compared with two thresholds
established in prior research. The first is a positive earnings per share and the second is
the prior year’s earnings per share. Results from applying both tobit and logistic
regression models suggest that managers are exploiting their discretion in recognizing
goodwill impairments to manage earnings. Thus, this project contributes to the earnings
management literature in that it highlights the exploitation of increased judgmental
latitude for earnings management purposes.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Goodwill, for financial accounting purposes, is an intangible asset on the balance
sheet that represents the excess of the amount paid for an acquired entity over the net fair
value of the assets acquired (FAS 142). The Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) has recently modified the rule regarding accounting for goodwill. FASB
Statement No. 142 (FAS 142) eliminates annual amortization of goodwill and requires
annual valuation to determine whether goodwill is impaired. If goodwill is impaired,
then a writedown is recognized on the income statement. Determining the amount of
impairment requires management estimation, thus, allowing managerial discretion in
developing the impairment amounts. Managerial discretion can then be used to manage
earnings, as documented in prior research (Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser, 1999;
Dechow and Skinner, 2000; Altamuro, Beatty, and Weber, 2005).
Managers must use professional judgment in financial reporting. Earnings
management occurs when this judgment is used as a facade to manipulate earnings
(Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Prior literature provides evidence that managers have strong
motivations, including capital market incentives, contracting incentives, and political
incentives, to manage earnings (Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn, 2002; Dechow and Skinner,
2000; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994). Managers may respond to these motivations by
1

managing earnings to exceed key earnings thresholds (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal,
2005; Degeorge et al., 1999). The role of earnings management has, therefore, become
an important issue in accounting research (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). This dissertation
examines evidence regarding manager discretion, which may lead to earnings
management through the valuation of goodwill when earnings will otherwise just miss
key earnings benchmarks. Implications from this line of research can be used in
assessing earnings management pervasiveness as well as overall financial reporting
integrity (Healy and Wahlen, 1999).
The new rule for accounting for goodwill provides an opportunity for earnings
management not available under the previous rule. The previous rule, set by the
Accounting Principles Board (APB) in Opinion 17 (APB 17), was based upon the
presumption that goodwill was a wasting asset (i.e., finite lived). As such, APB 17
mandated that goodwill should be amortized (expensed) over a maximum period of 40
years when calculating net income. The new rule regarding goodwill, set forth in FAS
142, does not presume that goodwill is a wasting asset. Rather, the FASB considers
goodwill to have an indefinite life, which should not be amortized but rather should be
tested on an annual basis for impairment (FAS 142, Summary). The estimates required
in the testing of goodwill for impairment require considerable managerial judgment,
thereby increasing the potential for earnings management beyond that which was
previously available (Watts, 2003a). This project addresses the question: Do managers
exploit their discretion in recognizing goodwill impairments to manage earnings?

2

Agency theory drives this study, prompting a critical look at how closely the
agent (e.g., management) complies with and strives to accomplish the goals of the
principals (e.g., the owners). Agency theory makes the presumption that both principals
and agents are motivated by self-interests while recognizing that cooperative effort must
be made to accomplish the goals of both parties (Fama, 1980). Agency theory is tested in
this study by considering whether managers exploit the discretion allowed them under the
new accounting guideline for taking goodwill impairment writedowns.
This study is important because the FASB may not have accomplished what was
intended when setting these standards if the new goodwill impairment rule is being used
as a tool for earnings management. The FASB’s primary intent in making the change
was to produce financial statements that would more accurately reflect the underlying
economics of the goodwill asset (FAS 142). If, however, the goodwill impairment rule is
being used as a tool for earnings management, both the goodwill value and the level of
earnings reported in the financial statements may be distorted.
The findings of this study are also important because prior literature indicates that
standard setters need to know which standards and which accruals are being used to
manage earnings (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Schipper and Vincent (2003) address the
question of the need for additional accounting standards to prevent earnings management.
Comparability of accounting numbers is potentially more impaired when greater amounts
of managerial estimates are involved in the preparation of financial statements,
particularly when there is an attempt to “subvert the intent of the standards” (Schipper
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and Vincent, 2003, p. 105). As such, Schipper and Vincent acknowledge that more
detailed guidelines might be considered. Results from this dissertation further inform
this question, suggesting that managers exploit their discretion in recognizing goodwill
impairments to manage earnings and that further regulatory action may be necessary.
Thus, this project contributes to the earnings management literature in that it highlights
the immediate exploitation of increased judgmental latitude for earnings management
purposes.
This study tests goodwill impairment writedowns taken for the year 2002 from
publicly- traded companies, whose financial information is contained in the Compustat1
and CRSP2 databases. Earnings per share, both before and after goodwill impairment
writedowns, is compared with two primary thresholds established in prior research. The
first threshold is whether the firm achieved positive earnings per share and the second
threshold is whether the firm made or exceeded prior year’s earnings per share. Both
tobit and logistic regressions are utilized to test the sample data. First, a set of seven
equations analyze the data using tobit regressions. Second, to test the robustness of the
tobit results, a set of seven equations evaluated with logistic regressions are also
performed on the data. Most of the hypotheses are supported by the results of the tobit
regressions performed on the sample data. The logistics regressions support the logit
results, adding robustness to the results. Results from applying both tobit and logistic
regression models, then, provide some evidence that managers are exploiting their
1

The Compustat database contains information from the financial statements of publicly-traded companies.
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discretion in recognizing goodwill impairments to manage earnings.
The balance of this dissertation is segmented as follows. Chapter II is a review of
the relevant literature. Chapter III develops the hypotheses and discusses the research
methodology. Chapter IV presents the results of the analyses. Chapter V presents the
conclusions and discusses the implications of the study.

2

The CRSP database tracks returns on the stocks of publicly-traded companies.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
To properly fulfill the duties required for financial reporting, managers must use
professional judgment. This inherent judgmental latitude, however, can be used to
camouflage management (or manipulation) of earnings. Managers are subjected to
strong motivations to manage earnings, especially to exceed key earnings thresholds
(Graham et al., 2005; Degeorge et al., 1999).
Goodwill is an intangible asset on the balance sheet that represents the “excess of
the cost of an acquired entity over the net of the amounts assigned to assets acquired and
liabilities assumed” (FAS 142, par. F1). The new accounting rule with respect to
goodwill provides an opportunity for earnings management beyond that which was
available under the previous rule. The previous rule, set by the Accounting Principles
Board (APB) in Opinion 17 (APB 17), was based upon the presumption that goodwill
was a wasting asset (i.e., finite lived) and, as such, should be amortized over a maximum
period of 40 years. The FASB, under the presumption that goodwill is not a wasting
asset, changed the rule. Considering goodwill to have an indefinite life, the FASB
mandated that goodwill should not be amortized but rather should be tested on an annual
basis, at a minimum, for impairment (FAS 142).
6

The FASB’s primary intent in making these changes was that financial statements
would better reflect the underlying economics of the goodwill asset (FAS 142). If the
new goodwill impairment rule is being used as a tool for earnings management, however,
the goodwill value reported in the financial statements may be distorted, either through
the level (dollar amount) or direction (increased or decreased earnings) of earnings
management taken.
Standard setters need to know which standards and which accruals are being used
to manage earnings. Such information will highlight areas in need of corrective action by
the standard setters. Therefore, information as to whether FAS 142 via goodwill
impairment write-offs is being used to manage earnings would be useful information to
the FASB and other standard setters.

Agency Theory
Coase (1937) proposed that firms exist and vary in size because of transaction
costs. Transaction costs are saved when property owners pool their rights and cooperate
in planned economic activity, thereby making it more advantageous to contract with a
firm rather than ordering from the open market. Firms arrive at an appropriate size that is
determined at the margin when the transaction cost savings are compared with the costs
of the firm’s internal planning and contract monitoring.
When property owners pool their rights and cooperate in economic activity, an
agency relationship emerges. Jensen and Meckling (1976) define an agency relationship
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as a contractual relationship where one party, the principal, engages another party, the
agent, to perform services on behalf of the principal. The contract includes delegation of
authority for the agent to make some decisions on behalf of the principal. Thus, Baiman
(1982) defines the firm as “an overlapping set of contracts among principals and agents,
each of whom is assumed to be motivated solely by self-interest” (p. 155).
Two troublesome characteristics of the agency relationship are information
asymmetry and lack of goal congruence (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 2007).
Information asymmetry exists because the agent has access to information of which the
principal is unaware. Goal congruence is the designing of an agency contract such that
the goals of the agent are properly aligned with the goals of the principal, while keeping
the costs of doing so as low as possible. Goal congruence is desirable to encourage the
agent to accomplish the goals of the principal, even in the principal’s absence.
Although agency theory portrays principals and agents as being motivated
primarily by self-interest, both parties recognize that some level of cooperative effort is
needed to accomplish their individual goals and to compete with other firms (Fama,
1980). Since the individual is successful only if the firm is successful, a cooperative
effort should result in a Pareto improvement. That is, an increase to the welfare of one
party should not harm the other party (Baiman, 1982).
Beaver (1998) states that financial reporting typically plays two distinct, although
related, informational roles in the principal-agent relationship: evaluation and
contracting. The role of evaluation is to assist investors and other decision makers in
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choosing the best financial alternative available, such as the best investment portfolio.
The role of contracting is to encourage goal congruence by tying the agent’s
compensation to performance, often defined in financial reporting terms. One example is
a management incentive contract that is partially based on the firm’s net income. As
such, these roles highlight why the choice of accounting methods is considered to be so
important to management, investors, and financial reporting regulators.
This dissertation tests agency theory in a setting where the manager has discretion
over the amount of goodwill impairment writedown taken. The agency contract, which is
structured to encourage goal congruence, drives the actions taken by the manager.
Information asymmetry gives the advantage to the manager, since the manager possesses
information to which the principal does not have access. The manager, driven by selfinterest, will attempt to maximize his self-interest by achieving firm goals that are tied to
his contract, such as hitting the profit/sales levels necessary to collect the maximum
executive compensation, as well as capital market goals and political costs savings. As
such, the manager may use his discretion in determining the amount of goodwill
impairment writedowns to manage earnings to desired levels.
This dissertation is concerned with both roles of financial reporting since the
magnitude of accruals can alter the reported value of a company and the value of its
earnings. Thus, first, the magnitude of accruals could affect the decision maker’s
evaluation of one company as opposed to another. Second, the magnitude of accruals

9

could also impact contracting by either artificially increasing or decreasing the value of a
company or its reported earnings, and therefore, the compensation earned by managers.

Earnings Management
Managers must use judgment in financial reporting. Earnings management is
always a possibility due to this judgmental latitude. Two basic definitions of earnings
management are given in the accounting literature. Earnings management is considered
to be stellar and commendable when managerial judgment is used as a tool to more
accurately report the underlying economic performance of a company to its stakeholders
(Francis, Hanna, and Vincent, 1996). However, earnings management is not considered
commendable when managerial judgment is used to “either mislead stakeholders about
the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers” (Healy and Wahlen, 1999, p.
368).
Schipper (1989) refers to the first of these two types of behavior as coming from
an “informational perspective.” Pourciau (1993) refers to the second of these two types
of behavior as “opportunistic” earnings management. Obviously, opportunistic earnings
management can result in financial reports that range from a slight misrepresentation to a
gross misrepresentation of the underlying economic performance or condition of a
company. The role of earnings management has thus become an important issue in
accounting research. Evidence from earnings management accounting research should
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help both regulators and standard setters to better assess earnings management
pervasiveness and overall financial reporting integrity (Healy and Wahlen, 1999).
Prior research has shown that both managers and shareholders have powerful
inducements to manage earnings, particularly to meet or beat key earnings benchmarks
(Graham et al., 2005; Degeorge et al., 1999; Dye, 1988). These inducements include
capital market incentives, contracting incentives, and political incentives (Graham et al.,
2005; Bartov et al., 2002; Dechow and Skinner, 2000; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994).
Several techniques by which earnings management is accomplished have been
acknowledged in prior literature. These techniques include:
•

Income Smoothing. Income smoothing is the deliberate manipulation of the
timing of reported income and expenses to achieve a stable level of income
(Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995).3 Typically, income smoothing is combined with
an effort to avoid earnings decreases and small losses. That is, income smoothing
is used to help reflect an on-going pattern of small earnings increases
(Burghstahler and Dichev, 1997).4

•

“Cookie Jar” Reserves. “Cookie jar” reserves are created by delaying recognition
of income (or expenses) until later periods when income is less (or more) than the
desired level to meet key earnings benchmarks (Giroux, 2004).5

3

An implicit assumption is that management engages in income smoothing to improve the perceived value
of its performance (Lambert, 1984).
4
Greater than 50% of the enforcement cases filed by the SEC in 1999 and 2000 involved accelerated
revenue recognition issues (Sevin and Schroeder, 2005).
5
Cookie jar reserves are typically used in the effort to smooth income.
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•

Accelerating Revenue Recognition. Accelerating revenue recognition is the
recording of revenue prior to its being earned (Sevin and Schroeder, 2005).

•

“Big Bath” Charges. “Big bath” charges are the aggressive overstatement of
charges in a period when earnings have already not met key earnings benchmarks.
Thus, big bath charges typically result in lower expense in future periods,
improving future earnings reports and reducing their variability (Jordan and
Clark, 2004; Walsh, Craig, and Clark, 1991).6

•

Discretion in Accounting Estimates. Discretion in estimates is the latitude
allowed managers to determine the level or amount of estimated expense (such as
bad debt, research and development costs, and asset impairment loss) to recognize
within the confines of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).

•

Discretion in Accounting Method Choices. Discretion in accounting choices is
the latitude allowed managers to choose among alternative methods of accounting
(such as depreciation methods) within the confines of GAAP (Heflin, Kwon, and
Wild, 2002).7

6

Elliott and Shaw (1988) defined a big bath as a writedown that exceeds 1% of the book value of the
firm’s assets. The “opportunity to take the bath is always there and management has the discretion to
choose just when, and how hard, to turn on the tap” (Walsh et al., 1991, p. 174). The penalty for taking a
big bath does not appear to be much greater than the penalty for missing an earnings benchmark by a small
amount (Jordan and Clark, 2004).
7
Research has shown that contractual agreements largely determine managers’ accounting choices (Heflin
et al., 2002).
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Accounting Standards
Goodwill is an intangible asset on the balance sheet that represents the excess
amount paid for an acquired entity above the net fair values of the acquired assets and
assumed liabilities (FAS 142). The APB set the rule for accounting for goodwill in APB
17 that became effective in 1970. This rule was based upon the presumption that
goodwill is a wasting asset (i.e., finite lived) and, as such, should be amortized when
calculating net income (APB 17, par. 29).
After 32 years,8 the rule regarding goodwill was changed by the FASB. The
FASB established the new guideline for writedowns of goodwill when it issued the
following statements in tandem: FASB Statement 141 (FAS 141) - Business
Combinations and FASB Statement 142 (FAS 142) - Goodwill and Other Intangible
Assets. Both statements are effective for all new business combinations,9 which have a
start date subsequent to June 30, 2001 (FAS 141 and FAS 142). FAS 142 is effective for
all other goodwill assets for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2001 (FAS 142).
“Other goodwill” as mentioned here is goodwill that is on the balance sheet from
acquisitions prior to June 30, 2001.
FAS 141 eliminates the Pooling-of-Interests10 accounting for business
combinations, thereby requiring that all business combinations be recorded under the

8

Par. 33 of APB 17 established its effective date as after October 31, 1970.
FAS 141 and FAS 142 are, however, not effective for combinations between mutual companies or for
not-for-profit combinations.
10
The pooling-of-interests method to record business combinations uses historical values of the assets from
the firms being combined.
9

13

Purchase Method11 (FAS 141, par. 13). FAS 141 effectively dictates that goodwill will
become a potential asset in every business combination since goodwill represents the
excess of the amount paid for an acquired entity above the net fair values of the acquired
assets and assumed liabilities. Goodwill was not recorded under the pooling-of-interests
method because the method simply combined the historical book values of the assets and
liabilities of both firms.
Contrary to the presumption of APB 17, FAS 142 does not assume that goodwill
is a wasting asset. Rather, the FASB considers goodwill to have an indefinite life (FAS
142, Summary). Therefore, FAS 142 eliminates annual amortization of goodwill and
mandates annual valuation for potential impairment of goodwill with consequent
writedown.
Impairment testing is conducted on a reporting unit level. A reporting unit is “an
operating segment or one level below an operating segment” (FAS 142, par. F1). An
operating segment is defined by FAS 131, par. 10 as follows:
An operating segment is a component of an enterprise:
a. that engages in business activities from which it may earn
revenues and incur expenses,
b. whose operating results are regularly reviewed by the
enterprise’s chief operating decision maker to make
decisions about resources to be allocated to the segment
and assess its performance, and
c. for which discrete financial information is available.

11

The purchase method makes the assumption that one firm is the acquirer and the purchase is recorded by
the acquirer using the fair values of the assets of the firm being acquired.
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Impairment testing is a two-step process. First, potential impairment is identified
by comparing “the fair value of a reporting unit with its carrying value, including
goodwill” (FAS 142, par. 19). Second, the amount of impairment, if any, is measured as
the amount that the carrying value exceeds the fair value of the assets of the reporting
unit. However, the impairment loss is limited to the “carrying amount of goodwill” (FAS
142, par. 20). Goodwill impairment loss recognized by a subsidiary will only be
recognized at the consolidated level if the goodwill of the consolidated unit is also
impaired (FAS 142, par. 37).
The following is an example of impairment testing:12
Holly, Inc. purchased its Britt division two years ago for $3
million. Holly is performing the annual impairment test on
its Britt division.
The net assets of the Britt division have the following
carrying values:
Cash
$ 350,000
Receivables
500,000
Inventories
900,000
Property, Plant, and Equipment (net)
1,200,000
Goodwill
1,000,000
Less: Notes Payable
(400,000)
Net Assets
$3,550,000
If Holly determines that the fair value of the Britt division
is $4 million, it will not recognize an impairment loss
because the fair value of Britt is greater than the carrying
value of its net assets.
If, however, the fair value of the Britt division is
determined to be $3 million, then the impairment loss will
12

This example of impairment testing is designed along similar lines to that provided in the text by Kieso,
Weygandt, and Warfield (2007) as directed by the guidelines provided in FAS 142.
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be calculated by first calculating the “implied” value of
goodwill and comparing it with the carrying value of
goodwill as follows:
Fair value of Britt division
Carrying value of net assets, excluding
goodwill
Implied value of goodwill

$3,000,000

Carrying value of goodwill
Implied value of goodwill
Impairment Loss

$1,000,000
450,000
$ 550,000

2,550,000
$ 450,000

This impairment test should be performed on all divisions
that have the goodwill asset. Finally, this test should be
performed for the overall consolidated unit, Holly, to
determine if an impairment loss exists at the consolidated
level. The impairment loss for the Britt division will only
be recognized at the consolidated level if an impairment
loss also exists at the consolidated level.
Goodwill impairment testing shall be conducted at a minimum on an annual basis,
with an initial transitional test to be conducted as of the beginning of the fiscal year that
FAS 142 becomes applicable to a reporting entity. Thus, in the year of implementation,
an entity may report two separate writedowns: one related to the initial transitional test
and the other resulting from the fiscal year-end valuation. Subsequent reversal of
goodwill impairment writedowns is prohibited (FAS 142).
The FASB mandated the new rule for the accounting of goodwill because the
FASB concluded that the changes would result in financial statements that are a better
reflection, or a more faithful representation, of the underlying economic condition of the
firm (FAS 142). FASB Concepts Statement No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics of
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Accounting Information, puts forth the concept of “representational faithfulness” as a
desirable characteristic of financial statements. However, the new rule may provide an
opportunity for earnings management unavailable under the previous rule. This
opportunity arises from the new flexibility in the amounts and timing of goodwill
writedowns.
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) has responded
to the new rule for accounting for goodwill by developing a valuation standard to assist
its members in this valuation process. It has issued an Exposure Draft, Valuation of a
Business, Business Ownership Interest, Security, or Intangible Asset, that specifically
addresses the issues involved. The Exposure Draft is now in its second revision, dated
October 16, 2006 with a request for comments that was open for discussion through
December 15, 2006. Once finalized, the valuation standard will become binding on all
AICPA members.
Although the valuation standard is not yet finalized, the impact of FAS 141 and
142 can be immediately seen in accounting for in-process research and development
(IPR&D) write-offs. Over the past decade, many corporations have been criticized for
managing earnings by taking excessive IPR&D write-offs. IPR&D costs were often
lumped together with a portion of the goodwill asset, resulting in an IPR&D write-off
that actually was a combined write-off of IPR&D and goodwill. FAS 142 effectively
requires more transparent accounting by requiring that goodwill be separately accounted
for on both the balance sheet and income statement (Patrick, 2005).
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Prior to FAS 141 and 142, many managers favored high IPR&D write-offs as it
would lower future goodwill amortization charges, thereby increasing future earnings per
share.13 In addition, the lower asset base would result in higher profitability ratios. Prior
to the 1990s, the percentages of write-offs for IPR&D were insignificant. However,
write-offs of these costs have become large percentages (sometimes greater than 75%) of
the purchase price. As a result, scrutiny of these write-offs by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) has also increased (Patrick, 2005).
As mentioned above, prior to FAS 141 and 142, most companies lumped other
intangibles with goodwill. Whether intended or not, combining other intangibles with the
goodwill asset results in an overstatement of goodwill (Reason, 2003). Firms then
amortized the combined intangible assets over the weighted average life of all the
intangible assets. This approach often led to an amortization period shorter than the 40year amortization period for goodwill. The practice, even though not technically correct,
was inexpensive and was accepted by both auditors and the SEC. However, following
the passage of FAS 141 and 142, the SEC is increasingly challenging the valuation
practices of public companies, placing heavy emphasis on goodwill accounting. As a
result, public companies have begun paying large amounts of money for valuation
services that offer a structured valuation process as well as a paper trail (Reason, 2003).

13

Sufficiently high level of write-offs of IPR&D to lower future expenses is an example of earnings
management via big-bath charges.
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Popular Press
The popular press has readily acknowledged the existence of opportunistic
earnings management. For example, while speculating on the impact of the September
11, 2001 attacks on the U.S., Henry (2001), writing for Business Week, concluded that
many companies would use the attacks as an excuse for not making the expected profits
for the year. Under the guise of losses from the attacks, the expectation was that earnings
management would be overwhelmingly used to artificially lower earnings in 2001.
Taking excess losses, or a “big bath,” in 2001 was expected to help create rosy results for
2002. Henry (2001) expressed concern that earnings management would so seriously
distort reported earnings that the investor who relied on reported earnings to make
decisions during the 2001-2002 period was indeed in peril. Charles L. Hill, research
director at First Call14, is quoted as saying that earnings management has been so
frequently engaged that “open season” has been declared on investors.
This obvious and overt use of earnings management has come with the blessings
of many Wall Street analysts. Sean Ryan, a bank analyst at the Fulcrum Global Partners
brokerage firm stated “There is a tolerance bordering on a thirst for earnings
management. As irrational as it may be, the market is likely to reward banks that ball up
all of their problems and take big hits in the second half of this year” (Henry, 2001, p.
46).

14

First Call, a Thomson Financial company, is a brokerage research firm. Thomson Financial provides
financial information services worldwide.
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Transparency in financial reporting exists when the financial statements faithfully
represent and clearly communicate the underlying financial condition of the firm. The
need for more transparency in financial reporting was readily acknowledged, especially
since recent scandalous and fraudulent behavior, such as the Enron and WorldCom
debacles, has cost the investing public heavily (Fink, 2006). Implementation of FAS 141
and 142 improves financial reporting by requiring increased transparency. Managers
must now report identifiable intangible assets separately and must include a line item on
the income statement to communicate impairment loss.
Several industries have weighed-in on the new goodwill accounting rule. Most
have indicated initial skepticism followed by an appreciation of the results available due
to the use of the purchase method and of more transparent accounting practices. The
opinions expressed by a few of the industry publications are briefly discussed in the next
paragraphs.
Investment bankers said that the change of method seems to have increased
rationality in the bank merger and acquisition process (Cocheo, 2002). Although initially
concerned over the loss of the pooling method, the banking community has come to
realize that the change to the ‘purchase method only’ is really to its advantage. The
purchase method created new opportunities in acquisitions. One such opportunity is the
ability to acquire only a portion of a target rather than having to acquire the entire
operation. Charles Miller, managing director of Alex Sheshunoff & Co. of Austin, Texas

20

is quoted as saying “Pooling was so restrictive. Purchase accounting allows you to do
what makes economic sense” (Cocheo, 2002, p. 8).
The media industry has been greatly impacted by the new goodwill rule,
especially those that made huge acquisitions in the years just prior to the effective date of
the new rule (Higgins, 2002). AOL reduced its asset base by 25%-30% by writing off
goodwill related to its Time Warner takeover in January 2001. Speaking of the initial
evaluation and write-off required per the new standard, media analyst Tom Wolzien is
quoted as saying “This is your one-time chance to open up the closet and bring out the
skeletons” (Higgins, 2002, p. 7).
The marketplace recognized that the new goodwill rule would have a big impact
on those firms that were primarily built through acquisitions. Korman (2002), writing for
Engineering News, acknowledged that these firms would take a big hit to their balance
sheets in 2002, indicating that this hit could prove difficult for contractors as it could
limit the abilities of these firms to acquire surety bonds. However, Korman also
remained optimistic that most of the damage would come with the initial writedown,
thereby increasing earnings per share in future accounting periods.
The electronics/high-tech industry has used the new goodwill accounting rule as
an impetus to adopt policies of greater disclosure of information to its customers,
vendors, and investors (Ojo, 2002). David Hawkins, an accounting consultant to Merrill
Lynch & Co., Inc., New York, states that “FAS 142 … [has] the potential to provide
investors with many valuation and financial analysis insights into the companies they
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follow. Do not miss this opportunity. Check out which reporting units are giving rise to
the goodwill impairment charge” (Ojo, 2002, p. 1).
Since FAS 142 eliminates amortization, the electronics industry also viewed FAS
142 as eliminating the need for pro forma reporting (Ojo, 2002). Thus, implementation
of FAS 142 is expected to improve financial reporting. However, analysts expect
companies that use pro forma accounting as a tool to exclude some of their operating
costs to continue to do so. Chuck Hill, director of research at First Call Corp., states “I
don’t know if FAS 142 is sounding the death knell of pro forma reporting, but it’s
another nail in its coffin. Adjusted earnings will not go away, but we need to clean it
out” (Ojo, 2002, p. 2).
Goodwill is often the “most valuable commodity in deals for firms with assets of
a few MBAs and a good idea” (Davis, 2002, p. 55). As such, mergers and acquisitions
lawyers servicing the high tech industry viewed the new accounting rule with a wary eye.
Pooling accounting has allowed these firms to ignore the value of goodwill and to avoid
taking mandatory goodwill amortization charges, which could reduce the firms’ net
income. However, purchase accounting as required by FAS 142 has given these
attorneys additional flexibility to structure business deals without being concerned about
meeting the stringent requirements to qualify as a pooling combination. This new
flexibility, though, has been viewed as having a ‘dark side:’ the requirement for annual
impairment testing. The annual impairment testing means that every year the business
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deal will be ‘second-guessed,’ increasing the need to be very careful when initially
evaluating the deal (Davis, 2002).
Both buyers and sellers in the high tech industry should then consider the legal
implications (Davis, 2002). Diane Frankle, co-chair of the mergers and acquisitions
group at Gray Cary Ware & Freidenrich law firm in Palo Alto, California, was concerned
that a company that takes a significant goodwill impairment loss could get sued by its
shareholders for having paid “too much for a target company” (Davis, 2002, p. 55).
Richard Climan, head of mergers and acquisitions at Cooley Godward law firm, Palo
Alto, recommended a pro-active approach for these attorneys: one, develop an
appreciation of the new rule and, two, bring in the accountants as soon as possible on a
business deal for their guidance concerning the new rule (Davis, 2002).
Hepburn (2002), writing for Marketing Management, pointed out that while some
view the new goodwill accounting rule as a necessary accounting evil, the new rule
makes investors consider carefully why impairments are necessary and communicate that
information. As a result, investors better comprehend the value of the organization and
the potential for investment. As FAS 142 is adopted by companies, investors will benefit
from more transparent accounting. For example, FAS 142 should prevent the common
practice of acquisition companies acquiring vulnerable firms and then leveraging the
undervalued brands.
In summary, conventional wisdom in the marketplace is that earnings
management has been used for some time and that its use has been increasing over the
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years. For instance, in a review of changes in practices in corporate finance over the past
twenty years, “Paradigm Shifts,” (2005) in CFO Magazine stated that “For most public
companies, earnings management became standard operating procedure, and the better
they got at it, the more intense the pressure from Wall Street analysts to hit quarterly
expectations to the penny” (p. 46). However, failure of several major public companies
due to scandalous behavior has greatly eroded the public trust. This loss of trust has
brought the need for increased transparency in financial reporting to the forefront.
Regulators have been responding to the need by issuing accounting rules, such as FAS
141 and 142, which effectively require increased disclosure. Firms have also been
responding to pressure from investors and regulators to provide more transparency in
financial reporting. One such demonstration of this response can be seen in the results of
a recent survey taken by CFO Magazine, indicating that “82 percent of public-company
finance executives disclose more information in their financial statements today than they
did three years ago” (Fink, 2006, pp. 54, 56).

Earnings Management Research
The judgmental latitude afforded managers in financial reporting can be used to
facilitate earnings management. As stated earlier, managers are highly motivated to
manage earnings, particularly around key earnings benchmarks. Therefore, earnings
management issues are extremely important to accounting researchers and to financial
reporting regulators.
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Motivations for Earnings Management
Strong motivations drive not only managers to manage earnings, but also
shareholders to permit managers to manage earnings. These motivations include capital
market incentives, contracting incentives, and political incentives.

Shareholder Incentives
Dye (1988) contends that shareholders might want managers to engage in
earnings management for two reasons: an internal demand and an external demand. The
internal demand for earnings management stems from shareholders encouraging
management to select the actions desired by the shareholders (i.e., goal congruence).
Shareholders consider earnings management to be a cost to accomplish this alignment of
goals. The external demand for earnings management stems from the desire of
shareholders to, one, alter how a potential investor might view the value of the firm and
to, two, procure better contractual terms with other firms.

Capital Market Incentives
Capital market incentives for earnings management include a desire to improve
the appearance of financial statements before making public securities’ offerings and a
desire to avoid drops in the stock market (Bartov et al., 2002; Healy and Wahlen, 1999).
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Prior literature provides much evidence that the stock market rewards firms that
have long streams of increasing earnings. Barth, Elliott, and Finn (1999) find that firms
reporting a stream of earnings increases are rewarded in the market with higher price-toearnings (PE) ratios; and they further determine that the PE ratios increase as the length
of the uninterrupted stream of earnings increases lengthens. The study also finds that the
PE ratios are greatly reduced when the stream is interrupted. DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and
Skinner (1996) report that firms experiencing an interruption in the stream of earnings
increases are penalized in the year of interruption by an average 14% negative stock
return. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) also cite anecdotal evidence that the stock market
rewards firms that have long streams of increasing earnings.
Prior literature also provides evidence that firms manipulate earnings to avoid
reporting losses. Hayn (1995) and Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) demonstrate that a
higher than expected number of firms report earnings just above zero and distinctly fewer
than expected report earnings just below zero, when assuming a normal distribution.
Both studies conclude that many firms that should report small losses are manipulating
earnings upward to “cross the line” to report positive earnings.
Firms that meet or beat analysts’ expectations are also rewarded in the stock
market. Bartov et al. (2002) find that firms that meet or beat analysts’ expectations
experience higher returns than do similar firms that fail to meet or beat analysts’
expectations. They further conclude that this premium is rewarded whether or not
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earnings are managed to accomplish the goal of meeting or beating analysts’
expectations.
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) consider two possible reasons for earnings
management to avoid reporting earnings decreases and losses. First, firms
opportunistically manage earnings to decrease the costs of transacting with stakeholders,
assuming that many stakeholder decisions are made based simply upon the incidence of
incurring a loss or incurring an earnings decrease. Second, prospect theory15 suggests
that it is at the point of going from a loss to a gain that one experiences the greatest
increases in utility, thereby creating the greatest incentives for earnings management.
Most earnings management literature is based upon empirical tests applied to
archival data. However, Graham et al. (2005) conducted a survey of more than 400 chief
financial officers (CFOs). This survey basically supports the archival results found in
prior literature. For instance, 78% of the CFOs admit to having given up long-term
economic value to smooth income in the short-term. They indicate that the market reacts
strongly to declines in earnings or to slight misses of earnings benchmarks. The CFOs
perceive that the market assumes that most companies have the ability to tweak earnings
enough to meet or beat the benchmarks, and further consider the failure to do so as an
indicator of serious problems within the company. Therefore, the CFOs feel that it is

15

Prospect theory was introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Although this theory primarily
concentrated on monetary outcomes, the authors state: “The main properties of the proposed value
function for money should apply to other attributes as well. In particular, we expect outcomes to be coded
as gains or losses relative to a neutral reference point, and losses to loom larger than gains” (p. 288).
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their responsibility to ensure that a smooth earnings stream is maintained (Graham et al.,
2005).

Contracting Incentives
Contracting incentives for earnings management include the desire to increase
managerial compensation and job security and the desire to avoid violating debt contracts
(Healy and Wahlen, 1999).

Managerial Compensation Contracts
Executives at major firms can command huge compensation packages, which are
strong incentives to manage earnings to meet contractual obligations and key earnings
benchmarks (Giroux, 2004).16 Several studies provide evidence that managers will likely
manage earnings when their bonuses are affected by the level of reported earnings
(Guidry, Leone, and Rock, 1999; Healy, 1985; Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan , 1995).
Stock options, offered as a means of compensation to managers, have long been
regarded as an excellent method of aligning the goals of managers with those of
shareholders (Bartov and Mohanram, 2004). As such, “stock options have become the
single most important component of executive compensation” (Gaver, 2003, p. 583).
However, research has shown that managers will opportunistically manage earnings to
ensure the best result for themselves from exercising these options (Bartov and
16

For instance, at retirement, the compensation package of Jack Welch, CEO of General Electric, consisted
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Mohanram, 2004). One approach to managing earnings for this purpose is to manipulate
the reported earnings downward (Subramanyam, 1996). Managing the earnings
downward just prior to the date that the options are awarded temporarily depresses the
stock price, which results in a lower exercise price for the stock options (Baker, Collins,
and Reitenga, 2003). Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) “provide evidence that the use
of discretionary accruals to manipulate reported earnings is more pronounced at firms
where the CEO’s potential total compensation is more closely tied to the value of stock
and option holdings” (p. 511).
In addition, Heflin et al. (2002) suggest that managers use income smoothing
techniques and discretion in accounting choices to increase managerial compensation.
Dechow and Sloan (1991) demonstrate that CEOs often increase reported earnings by
reducing R&D spending in their last years with the firm. Incentives to improve earnings
are considered to be stronger in the last years with a firm to not only improve the
likelihood of meeting the requirements for managerial bonuses, but to also decrease the
likelihood of termination with the firm.
CFOs surveyed by Graham et al. (2005) admit that external career reputation is
very important and is a strong incentive to manage earnings. However, contrary to the
literature, these executives contend that compensation contracts themselves are not a
strong incentive to manage earnings. The fact that the CFOs were interviewed directly,
though, is considered by Graham et al. to be a potential disadvantage when discussing
of an annual compensation package in excess of $16 million and a stock options retirement package worth
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agency issues. That is, “the executives may be unwilling to admit to undesirable
behavior, especially if agency issues are important” (Graham et al., 2005, p. 6).
However, this is obviously not a problem with all agency issues since the “executives
admit to sacrificing economic value to achieve reporting objectives” (Graham et al.,
2005, p. 6).

Debt Covenants
Creditors often protect their interests by placing restrictions in debt covenants that
limit management’s ability to benefit the shareholders at the creditors’ expense. Such
limitations might include restrictions related to dividend payouts, interest coverage, and
debt-equity ratios. Dividend payout restrictions are the easiest to comply with since
firms can simply cut back on dividend payouts when necessary. As such, prior studies
indicate that little evidence exists of earnings management to comply with the dividend
payout restriction (Healy and Palepu, 1990; DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner, 1994).
However, firms find it more difficult to avoid other types of debt covenant violations.
Heflin et al. (2002) contend that managers manage earnings to meet such contractual
obligations by using discretion in accounting choices. DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and
Sweeney (1994) conduct studies on samples of firms that violated debt covenants. They
find evidence of earnings management to increase earnings in periods just prior to the
debt covenant violations.

a quarter of a billion dollars (Giroux, 2004).
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Political Incentives
Political incentives for earnings management include the desire to reduce costs to
comply with regulations or to increase the benefits derived from complying with
regulations (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Watts and Zimmerman (1978) develop what is
commonly called the “political cost hypothesis.” This hypothesis basically asserts that
firms facing possible intervention by government agencies have a great incentive to
manage earnings downward to avoid the costs of such intervention. Watts and
Zimmerman conclude that price controls are very costly, impacting both a firm’s earnings
and its cash flows, creating strong incentives to manage earnings. Navissi (1999) finds
that manufacturing firms in New Zealand managed earnings to reduce the impact from
two sets of price regulations that were issued in 1971 and 1972. Jones (1991) determines
that firms manage earnings downward to reduce the impact of import relief
investigations. Cahan, Chavis, and Elmendorf (1997) also provide evidence that U.S.
chemical firms took income-decreasing accruals to reduce earnings in 1979 to avoid costs
related to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Recovery
Act of 1980.
To summarize, both shareholders and managers are strongly motivated to manage
earnings. Managers are especially susceptible to capital market incentives, contracting
incentives, and political incentives (Graham et al., 2005; Healy and Wahlen, 1999).
Capital market concerns that the firm maintains a stable, but increasing, level of income
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over time is an especially strong incentive to manage earnings (Graham et al., 2005;
Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). Increased managerial compensation, job security, and
the desire to avoid violating debt contracts are also strong contracting incentives for
earnings management (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Political incentives for earnings
management include the desire to reduce costs to comply with regulations or to increase
the benefits derived from complying with regulations (Healy and Wahlen, 1999).

Benchmark Earnings Management Research
A great deal of research effort has been expended to detect the methods by which
earnings management is conducted to satisfy the aforementioned motivations. Degeorge
et al. (1999) conclude that earnings are managed to exceed thresholds. They provide
evidence for three primary thresholds with an hierarchy: 1) to make a positive earnings
per share (most important), 2) to beat previous period’s earnings, and 3) to beat analysts’
forecasts (least important). The hierarchy in this case means that the first benchmark of
concern is to make positive earnings per share. If the first benchmark is met, the second
benchmark of concern is to beat prior period’s earnings. Finally, if the second
benchmark is met, the third benchmark of concern is to beat analysts’ forecasts.
Degeorge et al. contend that management must focus on these earnings thresholds
because parties concerned with the firm’s performance (i.e., bankers, investors, analysts,
etc.) focus on them.
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The CFOs surveyed by Graham et al. (2005) contend that meeting or beating
earnings benchmarks is extremely important. The CFOs perceive earnings, as opposed to
cash flows and other financial indicators, to be the most important firm metric because it
is the key metric that concerns the market. The earnings benchmarks that the CFOs value
most highly are “quarterly earnings for the same quarter last year” and the analysts’
forecast (p. 5).
Dechow and Skinner (2000) conclude that “understanding management’s
incentives is key to understanding the desire to engage in earnings management” (pg.
248). As such, they expect firms that just beat benchmarks to be more likely to have
engaged in earnings management. Implications then are that firms that have been just
barely successful in meeting the benchmark are to be regarded with suspicion, while
firms that either miss the benchmark or beat it by a wide margin are regarded as less
likely to have managed earnings.
Most of the research to detect earnings management is concerned with accruals
manipulation. Roychowdhury (2006) finds evidence that firms also manipulate operating
activities to avoid reporting earnings losses and to meet analyst forecasts. The operating
activities so observed are “price discounts to temporarily increase sales, overproduction
to report lower cost of goods sold, and reduction of discretionary expenditures to improve
reported margins” (Roychowdhury, 2006, p. 335). Marquardt and Weidman (2004) also
find that firms accelerate revenue recognition prior to equity offerings and delay revenue
recognition prior to management buyouts.
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Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) demonstrate that earnings management to avoid
earnings decreases and losses can be revealed in a cross-sectional distributional analysis
by showing irregularities in very narrow bandwidths around a benchmark, such as zero
earnings or prior-period earnings. These irregularities take the shape of an abnormal dip
just before the benchmark and an abnormal spike at or immediately following the
benchmark. Both Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Altamuro et al. (2005) take this test
one step further. They calculate the number of firms that should be expected to fall
within the bandwidth just below or within the bandwidth just above the benchmark in the
absence of earnings management. If the number of firms within the bandwidth is
significantly different from the expected number of firms, then earnings management is
suspected to have occurred.
Durtschi and Easton (2005), however, take exception to some of the conclusions
drawn by the earnings management literature regarding cross-sectional distributional
analysis, especially the conclusions of Burgstahler and Dichev (1997). In particular,
Durtschi and Easton assert that the shapes of frequency distributions of key earnings
metrics can be impacted by one or a combination of the following factors: 1) deflation,17
2) criteria used to select the sample data, or 3) differences in characteristics between the
observations just below the benchmark and observations just above the benchmark.
To demonstrate their assertion, Durtschi and Easton (2005) concentrate on price
as the deflator. Asserting that profit and loss firms are priced differently in the market,
17

Depending upon the type of deflator, the deflator can be significantly different for observations just
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their tests consider the effect on the zero earnings benchmark when price is used as the
deflator. Durtschi and Easton demonstrate that once the price deflator is removed, no
discontinuity exists in frequency distributions of key earnings benchmarks at zero. They
then conclude that the shapes of frequency distributions cannot be considered as “ipso
facto evidence of earnings management” (Durtschi and Easton, 2005, p. 558).
To summarize, researchers have expended great effort to detect the methods by
which earnings management is conducted. Earnings are perceived to be the firm metric
that most concerns the market (Graham et al., 2005). Research has established that
earnings are managed to meet or beat earnings benchmarks (Graham et al., 2005;
Degeorge et al., 1999). With some exceptions (for instance, when using price as the
deflator as demonstrated by Durtschi and Easton (2005)), earnings management around
benchmarks can be revealed in a cross-sectional distributional analysis (Burgstahler and
Dichev, 1997).

Goodwill Earnings Management Research
Prior literature shows that asset impairment writedowns have been historically
used for earnings management (Zucca and Campbell, 1992). On occasion, the asset
writedown has included a writedown of goodwill (Elliott and Shaw, 1988; Francis et al.,
1996). The new accounting rule provides an increased opportunity for earnings

below and for observations just above the benchmark.
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management from the new flexibility in the amounts and timing of goodwill writedowns.
Thus, recent literature reflects concerns in these areas.
Lander and Reinstein (2003) contend that FAS 142 is a step in the “right
direction,” but problems with implementation of the new accounting rule will persist due
to the complications and discretion in impairment testing. Watts (2003a) contends that
FAS 141 and 142 require managers to “make unverifiable estimates of the value of firms
as a whole or of the value of parts of firms when testing whether goodwill is impaired.
Assessment of the value of a firm and its implied goodwill is extremely subjective” (p.
218). Watts (2003b) is concerned that a significant increase in fraud will emerge as a
result of the goodwill impairment tests used in firm valuation as required by FAS 142.
The American Accounting Association Financial Accounting Standards
Committee published a commentary that appraises valuation models in light of testing for
goodwill impairment (Herz et al., 2001). This committee concluded that a problem exists
with impairment testing regardless of the valuation method used: the separation of
acquired goodwill from that of a parent or from that internally generated after the
acquisition. The problem is that goodwill impairment is only recognized at the
subsidiary level if goodwill is also impaired at the consolidated level. This problem also
arises since during the testing process the goodwill generated or eroded by a firm after an
acquisition is combined with the goodwill purchased and recorded on the books at the
time of the acquisition.

36

Hayn and Hughes (2006) perform a study of the leading indicators of goodwill
impairment and determine that financial statement disclosures do not provide enough
information for investors to predict the need for goodwill write-offs. Further, they find
that goodwill write-offs lag behind goodwill impairment by an average of three years,
and that the lag can be as long as ten years. Even though these tests were conducted on
pre-FAS 142 samples, Hayn and Hughes conducted sensitivity tests and conclude that the
results are generalizable to post-FAS 142 financial reporting.
A study by Jordan and Clark (2004) provides evidence that firms actually do
perform earnings management via the “big bath” technique. Specifically, they determine
that earnings management has occurred under the new goodwill guideline of FAS 142 by
applying the big bath technique. Sevin and Schroeder (2005) follow up on this study and
find that more small firms appeared to take advantage of the new guideline to take big
bath charges than did large firms. This finding is counter to Elliott and Shaw’s (1988)
conclusion that big baths are more likely to be taken by large firms.
To summarize, FAS 142 is acknowledged as an excellent attempt to bring about
goodwill accounting practices that will result in financial statements that more faithfully
represent the underlying economic conditions of the firm. However, problems with
implementation of this new accounting rule exist and are expected to persist due to the
complications and discretion in impairment testing (Lander and Reinstein, 2003).
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Earnings Management Detection Models
Three basic types of models have been used in earnings management literature:
those for aggregate accruals, those for specific accruals, and those for distributional
analysis of earnings (McNichols, 2000). Interpretation of the results in the earnings
management literature has often been controversial. McNichols contends that this
controversy is largely due to the attempt to determine discretionary behavior by use of
the aggregate models, and suggests that either the specific accruals models or the
distributional analysis models are better options for determining discretionary behavior.

Aggregate Accruals Models
Primarily, earnings management detection has employed four aggregate accruals
models since the mid-1980s: the Healy Model (Healy, 1985), the DeAngelo model
(DeAngelo, 1986), the Jones Model (Jones, 1991), and the Modified Jones Model
(Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995). These models generally attempt to break total
accruals into discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals components. Tests are then
applied to the resulting discretionary component to determine the likelihood of earnings
management.
The Healy Model (Healy, 1985) is a test of means of the total accruals. Healy
makes two assumptions that are central to the model. Healy assumes, first, that earnings
management occurs in all periods and, second, that nondiscretionary accruals are
constant over time. Healy’s approach is to divide the sample into three groups, one
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containing earnings predicted to have been managed upwards and two containing
earnings predicted to have been managed downwards. Effectively, the group assumed to
have been managed upward becomes the estimation period and the groups assumed to
have been managed downward become the event period. Nondiscretionary accruals are
then represented by the mean of the total accruals from the estimation period group
(Dechow et al., 1995).
The DeAngelo Model (DeAngelo, 1986) is an adaptation of the Healy Model. In
the DeAngelo Model, only nondiscretionary accruals from the prior year are used for the
estimation period (Dechow et al., 1995).
Unlike the Healy Model and the DeAngelo Model, the Jones Model (Jones, 1991)
does not consider nondiscretionary accruals to be constant. The Jones Model estimates
nondiscretionary accruals from a two-step process that considers changes in a firm’s
economic condition. First, nondiscretionary accruals are assumed to be the residual when
total accruals are regressed on changes in sales and changes in property, plant and
equipment. Second, nondiscretionary accruals are then regressed on changes in both
sales and changes in property, plant and equipment using firm-specific parameter
estimates from the first regression as the parameter coefficients. Results indicate that
approximately 25% of the variation in total accruals is explained by the Jones Model
(Jones, 1991).
The Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al., 1995) removes the implicit
assumption in the Jones Model that revenues are nondiscretionary by adjusting revenues
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for the change in receivables. This change should remove a bias toward zero earnings
management where revenues were used to manage earnings (Dechow et al., 1995).

Specific Accruals Model
The model typically used to test for specific accruals is an industry model, such as
the ones developed by Dechow and Sloan (1991), Petroni (1992), and Beaver and
McNichols (1998). The industry model assumes that firms across the same industry will
experience the same sources of variation in nondiscretionary accruals. The industry
model developed by Dechow and Sloan, for example, regresses nondiscretionary accruals
on the median total accruals for the industry. The primary advantage of the specific
accruals model is that it is easier to develop a greater understanding of the discretionary
versus nondiscretionary behavior. This advantage exists because the researcher can rely
on GAAP to understand what should be reflected in the account.

Distributional Analysis Model
Burghstahler and Dichev (1997) introduced a new method of detection, the crosssectional distributional method. This method has largely been used to detect earnings
management around key earnings benchmarks such as zero earnings, prior year’s
earnings and analysts’ earnings forecasts. The primary advantage of the distributional
analysis method is that the researcher can make strong predictions about the frequency of
earnings realizations that is likely to be due to discretionary earnings.
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The distributional analysis approach to detecting earnings management looks at
cross-sectional earnings distribution frequencies to determine whether firms are evenly
distributed at points just above and just below key earnings benchmarks. Earnings
management is suspected if there is an unusually low frequency of firms just below the
benchmark and an unusually high frequency of firms just above the benchmark.
To determine whether the frequency is unusually high or unusually low, a twostep process is used to calculate the expected frequency of firms absent the presence of
earnings management. First, divide the frequency into bandwidths of equal distance,
called bins. Second, calculate the average number of firms falling within the bin just
above and within the bin just below the bin of interest. Compare the average number that
is expected absent the presence of earnings management with the actual number of firms
within the bin of interest. If the number of firms within the bin of interest is significantly
different from the expected number of firms, then earnings management is suspected to
have occurred.
To summarize, researchers have attempted to continually develop better methods
of modeling discretionary behavior. The earlier models have, for the most part, been
replaced as later models have been developed that appear to have a greater level of
accuracy. The Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al., 1995) has been the primary
aggregate accruals model utilized since its introduction. However, McNichols (2000)
states that further progress in earnings management literature will require a departure
from the extensive use of aggregate accruals models. McNichols suggests that further
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progress in the earnings management literature will probably come from specific accruals
or distributional analysis tests or from a combination of both.
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CHAPTER III
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT AND METHODOLOGY
This chapter develops the hypotheses and discusses the methodology used to test
the data. The overall research hypothesis, informally stated, is that the discretion allowed
under the new goodwill impairment rule has been utilized as a tool for earnings
management. This paper contends that managers have seized the opportunity for
increased discretion to manage earnings. Thereby, earnings management can be detected
in the first year following the effective date for the new guideline.

Hypotheses Development
Professional judgment is required for financial reporting. However, prior
literature has demonstrated that this professional judgment is sometimes used to disguise
opportunistic earnings management (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Managers, being
subjected to strong motivations, are sometimes driven to manage earnings to exceed key
earnings thresholds (Graham et al., 2005; Bartov et al., 2002; DeFond and Jiambalvo,
1994). Key earnings thresholds, such as positive earnings and prior period earnings, are
viewed as important benchmarks of financial performance (Graham et al., 2005). A third
benchmark, not tested here, is reported earnings as opposed to financial analysts’
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predictions.18 The role of earnings management has, therefore, become a very significant
issue in accounting research (Healy and Wahlen, 1999).
The new rule for goodwill accounting provides an opportunity for earnings
management in addition to that which was available under the previous rule. The APB
established the previous rule, APB 17 (effective in 1970), upon the presumption that
goodwill is a wasting asset (i.e., finite lived). APB 17, therefore, mandated that goodwill
should be expensed over a maximum period of 40 years when calculating net income.
The FASB established the new rule regarding goodwill, FAS 142 (effective after 2001),
under the presumption that goodwill is not a wasting asset. That is, the FASB considers
goodwill to have an indefinite life, which should not be expensed annually but rather
should be tested on an annual basis for impairment (FAS 142, Summary). Considerable
managerial judgment is required with this goodwill impairment test due to the estimates
required, which increases the potential for earnings management beyond what was
previously available (Watts, 2003a). This paper, then, addresses the question: Do
managers exploit their discretion in recognizing goodwill impairments to manage
earnings? Specifically, this research tests whether firms that exceed zero earnings or
prior-year earnings by a very small amount have taken smaller goodwill writedowns than
firms that have exceeded the benchmarks by larger amounts.
Historically, the research design to detect earnings management from impairment
writedowns has utilized the following basic procedure:

18

Difficulty exists in accurately determining which financial metric the financial analysts’ are forecasting.
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•

First, calculate the amount of the writedown.

•

Second, calculate the average amount of writedowns for that industry during that
time frame.

•

Third, compare the firm’s writedown with the industry to see if an abnormality
exists.
These steps are also followed in this paper. However, since the new guideline

now dictates that writedowns of goodwill are separately identified in the financial
statements, it is not necessary to calculate the amount of the writedown for years after
December 2001. This amount can simply be taken from the income statement.
Burghstahler and Dichev (1997) introduced the cross-sectional distributional
method of detecting earnings management. This method has largely been used to detect
earnings management around key earnings benchmarks, by looking at cross-sectional
earnings distribution frequencies to determine whether firms are evenly distributed at
points just above and just below key earnings benchmarks. Earnings management is
suspected if an unusually low frequency of firms is found just below the benchmark and
an unusually high frequency of firms is just above the benchmark.
This research utilizes the cross-sectional distributional approach to detect
earnings management. Specifically, this project is attempting to determine if the firms
that just beat two key earnings benchmarks, zero value earnings and prior-year earnings,
by a very small amount also took very small goodwill impairment writedowns. The
assumption is that, if so, these firms are suspected of using the managerial discretion
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provided by the new guideline to take very small writedowns compared with other
positive earnings firms. This research considers two groups of four hypotheses to
provide evidence regarding whether the discretion allowed in the new goodwill guideline
has been used for opportunistic earnings management. The first set of four hypotheses is
analyzed with tobit regressions. The second set of four hypotheses is evaluated with
logistic regressions.
Both the tobit and logistic regressions take a maximum likelihood estimation
approach. The tobit regression model was developed by James Tobin (Tobin, 1958).
This model is an alternative to ordinary least squares regression when dependent
variables have very limited ranges, such as when “data on household expenditure on
automobiles has a lot of observations at 0, corresponding to households who choose not
to buy a car” (Kennedy, 1998). Many studies, then, that use the tobit model do so
because the dependent variable holds the value of zero for a large proportion of the
observations (Greene, 2003). As the majority of the observations in this study have the
value of zero for the amount of goodwill impairment taken (the dependent variable in the
first set of regressions), the tobit estimation model is used.
When the dependent variable is a dichotomous, qualitative variable, logistic
estimation is the most commonly used estimation approach (Kennedy, 1998). The
dependent variable in the second set of regressions in this study is dichotomous,
categorizing the firms based upon whether the amount of writedown taken was small or
large. Therefore, the second set of regressions is estimated with logistic models.
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Each of the hypotheses directly tests the earnings management behavior of firms
whose prewritedown earnings are positive and small in value, just beating one of the two
key earnings benchmarks. Hereafter, the firms defined in each hypothesis are referred to
as firms of interest and all references to earnings are to earnings per share.

Goodwill Hypotheses
Goodwill is the dependent variable in the first set of hypotheses. The variable
Goodwill represents the amount of impairment loss (scaled by number of outstanding
shares) taken by a firm. These designations were based upon the after-tax amount of
goodwill impairment recorded on the firm’s income statement as recorded by Compustat.
Firms were required to perform an initial evaluation test during the first three months in
the first year for which the guideline became effective, 2002. These adjustments are not
included in this data set. This sample is composed of entries from the second evaluation
test conducted during 2002, which is the first annual evaluation.
Boone et al. (2003) used several indicator variables to demonstrate asset
impairment losses taken specifically to manage earnings around one or more of the three
thresholds mentioned earlier. These indicator variables have been adopted as treatment
variables in this study.
The two treatment variables patterned after the Boone et al. (2003) paper are
zero/one indicator variables that measure the extent of incentive to manipulate created by
the proximity of pre-writedown earnings relative to the earnings benchmarks.
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ManipZero indicates whether the firm’s earnings (before special items and writedown)
are within the first decile19 of firms whose earnings exceed the zero value earnings
benchmark. ManipPY indicates whether the firm’s earnings (before special items and
writedown) are within the first decile20 of firms whose earnings exceed the prior-year
earnings benchmark.
Formally stated, the first group of tobit research hypotheses is as follows:
H1(a): Using zero value earnings as the benchmark, firms that have positive
prewritedown earnings and are in the first decile will have smaller writedowns
than firms in all other positive earnings firms.
H1(b): Using prior-year earnings as the benchmark, firms that have positive
prewritedown earnings and are in the first decile will have smaller writedowns
than firms in all other positive earnings firms.
These hypotheses are supported if the firms of interest have a negative slope for
the treatment variables, ManipZero and ManipPY, respectively. Support for the
hypotheses demonstrates that goodwill impairment writedowns are being understated.
The tobit models to test the above hypotheses are as follows:
Goodwilli = β 0 + β1ManipZeroi + β x Controlsi + ε i
Goodwilli = β 0 + β1ManipPYi + β x Controlsi + ε i

Equation
(1)
(2)

Where:

19

Firms with earnings that exceeded zero earnings were evenly divided into ten groups, with the first
decile containing the firms that exceeded zero earnings by the least dollar amounts and the tenth decile
containing the firms that exceeded zero earnings by the greatest dollar amounts.
20
Firms with earnings that exceeded prior-year earnings were evenly divided into ten groups, with the first
decile containing the firms that exceeded prior-year earnings by the least dollar amounts and the tenth
decile containing the firms that exceeded prior-year earnings by the greatest dollar amounts.
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Goodwill =

Dependent variable in each tobit model. Amount of goodwill
impairment taken (scaled by number of outstanding shares).

ManipZero= Zero/one indicator variable indicating that the firm’s earnings
(before writedown) are within the first decile of firms whose
earnings exceed the zero value earnings benchmark. Negative
values are expected when impairment is indicated.
ManipPY =

Zero/one indicator variable indicating that the firm’s earnings
(before writedown) are within the first decile of firms whose
earnings exceed the prior-year earnings benchmark. Negative
values are expected when impairment is indicated.

Controls =

Group of control variables used in prior research to determine the
need for impairment writedown. These control variables are used
in all the regressions and are discussed in detail later in this
chapter.

The next two treatment variables are similar to those patterned after the Boone et
al. (2003) paper. These variables are zero/one indicator variables that also measure the
extent of incentive to manipulate created by the proximity of pre-writedown earnings
relative to the earnings benchmarks. Z2$ is a zero/one indicator variable representing the
firms whose earnings (before writedown) exceed the zero value earnings benchmark by
up to two dollars.21 PY2$ is a zero/one indicator variable representing the firms whose
earnings (before writedown) exceed the prior-year earnings benchmark by up to two
dollars above prior-year earnings.

21

The two dollars interval for testing is an arbitrary amount that represents a small earnings per share.
Various amounts have been arbitrarily set and used for testing in prior literature. For instance, Burgstahler
and Dichev (1997) reported net income changes scaled by beginning-of-period market value of common
equity, using bin intervals of .0025. Altamuro et al. (2005) used bin widths of .75 percent of net income
scaled by end-of-period total assets. Durtschi and Easton (2005) conducted tests for earnings management
using a zero value benchmark and looking for discontinuities at the negative and the positive one cent
earnings per share.
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Formally stated, the second group of tobit research hypotheses is as follows:
H2(a): Using zero value earnings as the benchmark, firms that have positive
prewritedown earnings up to two dollars will have smaller writedowns than firms
in all other positive earnings firms.
H2(b): Using prior-year earnings as the benchmark, firms that have positive
prewritedown earnings up to two dollars will have smaller writedowns than firms
in all other positive earnings firms.
A negative slope for the treatment variable, Z2$ and PY2$ respectively, suggests
that each hypothesis is supported. This finding shows that goodwill impairment
writedowns are being understated.
The tobit models to test the above hypotheses are as follows:
Goodwilli = β 0 + β1Z2$i + β x Controlsi + ε i

(3)

Goodwilli = β 0 + β1 PY2$i + β x Controlsi + ε i

(4)

Where:
Z2$ =

Variable indicating the firms whose earnings (before writedown)
exceed the zero value earnings benchmark and that range up to two
dollars. Negative values are expected when impairment is
indicated.

PY2$ =

Variable indicating the firms whose earnings (before writedown)
exceed the prior-year earnings benchmark and that range up to two
dollars above prior-year earnings. Negative values are expected
when impairment is indicated.

Variables representing the three positive bins closest to the zero value earnings
benchmark make up the next group of treatment variables. These variables are zero/one
indicator variables. ZeroBin1 is a variable indicating that the firm’s earnings (before
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writedown) are within the first decile22 of firms whose earnings exceed the zero value
earnings benchmark. ZeroBin2 designates that the firm’s earnings (before writedown)
are within the second decile of firms whose earnings exceed the zero value earnings
benchmark. ZeroBin3 represents firms with earnings (before writedown) that are within
the third decile of firms whose earnings exceed the zero value earnings benchmark.
Likewise, variables designating the three positive bins closest to the prior-year
earnings benchmark compose the next set of treatment variables. These variables are
also zero/one indicator variables. These three variables are designed in a manner similar
to the ZeroBin variables above. Rather than indicating deciles exceeding the zero value
benchmark, PYBin1, PYBin2, and PYBin3 are variables indicating that the firm’s
earnings (before writedown) are within the first, second, and third deciles23, respectively,
of firms whose earnings exceed the prior-year earnings benchmark.
Formally stated, the third group of tobit research hypotheses is as follows:
H3(a): Using zero value earnings as the benchmark, firms that have positive
prewritedown earnings and are in the first decile will have smaller writedowns
than firms in all other positive earnings firms.
This hypothesis is supported if the firms of interest have a negative slope for
ZeroBin1, indicating that goodwill impairment writedowns are being understated.
H3(b): Using zero value earnings as the benchmark, firms that have positive
prewritedown earnings and are in the second decile will have smaller writedowns
22

Firms with earnings that exceeded zero earnings were evenly divided into ten groups, with the first
decile containing the firms that exceeded zero earnings by the least dollar amounts and the tenth decile
containing the firms that exceeded zero earnings by the greatest dollar amounts.
23
Firms with earnings that exceeded prior-year earnings were evenly divided into ten groups, with the first
decile containing the firms that exceeded prior-year earnings by the least dollar amounts and the tenth
decile containing the firms that exceeded prior-year earnings by the greatest dollar amounts.
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than firms in all other positive earnings firms, yet larger than those in the first
decile.
A negative slope for ZeroBin2 supports this hypothesis, demonstrating that
goodwill impairment writedowns are being understated. However, the relationship
between Goodwill and ZeroBin1 will be more negative than the relationship between
Goodwill and ZeroBin2. Therefore, goodwill impairment writedowns are being more
understated within the first decile beyond the zero earnings benchmark than in the second
decile beyond the zero earnings benchmark.
H3(c): Using zero value earnings as the benchmark, firms that have positive
prewritedown earnings and are in the third decile will have smaller writedowns
than firms in all other positive earnings firms, yet larger than those in the second
decile.
A negative slope for ZeroBin3 supports this hypothesis, suggesting that goodwill
impairment writedowns are being understated. However, the relationship between
Goodwill and ZeroBin2 will be more negative than the relationship between Goodwill
and ZeroBin3. This finding reveals that goodwill impairment writedowns are being
more understated within the second decile beyond the zero earnings benchmark than in
the third decile beyond the zero earnings benchmark.
H3(d): Using prior-year earnings as the benchmark, firms that have positive
prewritedown earnings and are in the first decile will have smaller writedowns
than firms in all other positive earnings firms.
This hypothesis is supported if the firms of interest have a negative slope for
PYBin1. This result points out that goodwill impairment writedowns are being
understated.
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H3(e): Using prior-year earnings as the benchmark, firms that have positive
prewritedown earnings and are in the second decile will have smaller writedowns
than firms in all other positive earnings firms, yet larger than those in the first
decile.
A negative slope for PYBin2 supports this hypothesis, indicating that goodwill
impairment writedowns are being understated. However, the relationship between
Goodwill and PYBin1 will be more negative than the relationship between Goodwill and
PYBin2. This finding signifies that goodwill impairment writedowns are being more
understated within the first decile beyond the zero earnings benchmark than in the second
decile beyond the zero earnings benchmark.
H3(f): Using prior-year earnings as the benchmark, firms that have positive
prewritedown earnings and are in the third decile will have smaller writedowns
than firms in all other positive earnings firms, yet larger than those in the second
decile.
A negative slope for PYBin3 supports this hypothesis, demonstrating that
goodwill impairment writedowns are being understated. However, the relationship
between Goodwill and PYBin2 will be more negative than the relationship between
Goodwill and PYBin3. This finding illustrates that goodwill impairment writedowns are
being more understated within the second decile beyond the zero earnings benchmark
than in the third decile beyond the zero earnings benchmark.
The tobit models to test the above hypotheses are as follows:
Goodwilli = β 0 + β1ZeroBin1i + β 2 ZeroBin2i + β 3 ZeroBin3i
+ β x Controlsi + ε i
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(5)

Goodwilli = β 0 + β1 PYBin1i + β 2 PYBin2i + β 3 PYBin3i
+ β x Controlsi + ε i

(6)

Where:
ZeroBin1 =

Zero/one indicator variable indicating that the firm’s earnings
(before writedown) are within the first decile of firms whose
earnings exceed the zero value earnings benchmark. Negative
values are expected when impairment is indicated.

ZeroBin2 =

Zero/one indicator variable indicating that the firm’s earnings
(before writedown) are within the second decile of firms whose
earnings exceed the zero value earnings benchmark. Negative
values are expected when impairment is indicated.

ZeroBin3 =

Zero/one indicator variable indicating that the firm’s earnings
(before writedown) are within the third decile of firms whose
earnings exceed the zero value earnings benchmark. Negative
values are expected when impairment is indicated.

PYBin1 =

Zero/one indicator variable indicating that the firm’s earnings
(before writedown) are within the first decile of firms whose
earnings exceed the prior-year earnings benchmark. Negative
values are expected when impairment is indicated.

PYBin2 =

Zero/one indicator variable indicating that the firm’s earnings
(before writedown) are within the second decile of firms whose
earnings exceed the prior-year earnings benchmark. Negative
values are expected when impairment is indicated.

PYBin3 =

Zero/one indicator variable indicating that the firm’s earnings
(before writedown) are within the third decile of firms whose
earnings exceed the prior-year earnings benchmark. Negative
values are expected when impairment is indicated.

The final group of treatment variables simply measures the relationship of
goodwill impairment to earnings per share. EPS is a variable indicating the earnings per
share (before writedown) for all positive earnings firms. EPSSqrd is a variable
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indicating the earnings per share (before writedown) squared for all positive earnings
firms.
Formally stated, the fourth group of tobit research hypotheses is as follows:
H4(a): Firms that have greater positive prewritedown earnings will have larger
writedowns than firms with small positive earnings.
A positive slope for EPS supports this hypothesis, suggesting that goodwill
impairment writedowns are being understated by firms with smaller, but positive,
earnings.
H4(b): As earnings for firms become very large, writedowns will become
smaller and smaller.
A negative slope for EPSSqrd reflects diminishing marginal returns and supports
this hypothesis, illustrating that large goodwill impairment writedowns are not typically
needed for very successful firms.
The tobit model to test the above hypotheses is as follows:
Goodwilli = β 0 + β1 EPSi + β 2 EPSSqrdi + β x Controlsi + ε i

(7)

Where:
EPS =

Variable indicating the earnings per share (before writedown) for
all positive earnings firms. Positive values are expected.

EPSSqrd =

Variable indicating the earnings per share (before writedown)
squared for all positive earnings firms. Negative values are
expected.
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ImpairFlag Hypotheses
The second set of four hypotheses is evaluated with logistic regressions. This set
of regressions is conducted as tests to see if the robustness of the tobit results hold with a
logistics model. These hypotheses are basically a repetition of the above tobit
regressions, except that ImpairFlag is the dependent variable. ImpairFlag is a zero/one
indicator variable where 0 represents a company that has taken a small impairment loss
and 1 represents a company that has taken a large impairment loss. Goodwill writedowns
up to .05 (after scaling by number of outstanding shares) are arbitrarily considered to be
small and comprise the small writedown category. Goodwill writedowns greater than .05
(after scaling by number of outstanding shares) are arbitrarily considered to be large and
comprise the large writedown category. The small category contains 1417 observations
with zero writedowns and 23 observations with writedowns greater than zero. The large
category has 33 observations, with the largest scaled writedown being 1.51. These
designations are based upon the after-tax amount of goodwill impairment recorded on the
firm’s income statement as recorded by Compustat.
Formally stated, the first group of logistic research hypotheses is as follows:
H5(a): Using zero value earnings as the benchmark, firms that have positive
prewritedown earnings and are in the first decile will have smaller writedowns
than firms in all other positive earnings firms.
H5(b): Using prior-year earnings as the benchmark, firms that have positive
prewritedown earnings and are in the first decile will have smaller writedowns
than firms in all other positive earnings firms.
The logistic models to test the above hypotheses are as follows:
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ImpairFlagi = β 0 + β1ManipZeroi + β x Controlsi + ε i

(8)

ImpairFlagi = β 0 + β1ManipPYi + β x Controlsi + ε i

(9)

Where:
ImpairFlag = Dependent variable in each logistic model. Indicator variable
where 0 indicates a firm with a small writedown and 1 indicates
a firm with a large writedown.
ManipZero= Zero/one indicator variable indicating that the firm’s earnings
(before writedown) are within the first decile of firms whose
earnings exceed the zero value earnings benchmark. Negative
values are expected when impairment is indicated.
ManipPY =

Zero/one indicator variable indicating that the firm’s earnings
(before writedown) are within the first decile of firms whose
earnings exceed the prior-year earnings benchmark. Negative
values are expected when impairment is indicated.

Formally stated, the second group of logistic research hypotheses is as follows:
H6(a): Using zero value earnings as the benchmark, firms that have positive
prewritedown earnings up to two dollars will have smaller writedowns than firms
in all other positive earnings firms.
H6(b): Using prior-year earnings as the benchmark, firms that have positive
prewritedown earnings up to two dollars will have smaller writedowns than firms
in all other positive earnings firms.

The logistic models to test the above hypotheses are as follows:
ImpairFlagi = β 0 + β1Z2$i + β x Controlsi + ε i

(10)

ImpairFlagi = β 0 + β1 PY2$i + β x Controlsi + ε i

(11)

Where:
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Z2$ =

Variable indicating the firms whose earnings (before writedown)
exceed the zero value earnings benchmark and that range up to two
dollars. Negative values are expected when impairment is
indicated.

PY2$s =

Variable indicating the firms whose earnings (before writedown)
Exceed the prior-year earnings benchmark and that range up to two
dollars above prior-year earnings. Negative values are expected
when impairment is indicated.

Formally stated, the third group of logistic research hypotheses is as follows:
H7(a): Using zero value earnings as the benchmark, firms that have positive
prewritedown earnings and are in the first decile will have smaller writedowns
than firms in all other positive earnings firms.
H7(b): Using zero value earnings as the benchmark, firms that have positive
prewritedown earnings and are in the second decile will have smaller writedowns
than firms in all other positive earnings firms, yet larger than those in the first
decile.
H7(c): Using zero value earnings as the benchmark, firms that have positive
prewritedown earnings and are in the third decile will have smaller writedowns
than firms in all other positive earnings firms, yet larger than those in the second
decile.
H7(d): Using prior-year earnings as the benchmark, firms that have positive
prewritedown earnings and are in the first decile will have smaller writedowns
than firms in all other positive earnings firms.
H7(e): Using prior-year earnings as the benchmark, firms that have positive
prewritedown earnings and are in the second decile will have smaller writedowns
than firms in all other positive earnings firms, yet larger than those in the first
decile.
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H7(f): Using prior-year earnings as the benchmark, firms that have positive
prewritedown earnings and are in the third decile will have smaller writedowns
than firms in all other positive earnings firms, yet larger than those in the second
decile.
The logistic model to test the above hypotheses is as follows:
ImpairFlag i = β 0 + β1ZeroBin1i + β 2 ZeroBin2i + β3 ZeroBin3i
+ β x Controlsi + ε i
ImpairFlagi = β 0 + β1 PYBin1i + β 2 PYBin2i + β3 PYBin3i
+ β xControlsi + ε i

(12)

(13)

Where:
ZeroBin1 =

Zero/one indicator variable indicating that the firm’s earnings
(before writedown) are within the first decile of firms whose
earnings exceed the zero value earnings benchmark. Negative
values are expected when impairment is indicated.

ZeroBin2 =

Zero/one indicator variable indicating that the firm’s earnings
(before writedown) are within the second decile of firms whose
earnings exceed the zero value earnings benchmark. Negative
values are expected when impairment is indicated.

ZeroBin3 =

Zero/one indicator variable indicating that the firm’s earnings
(before writedown) are within the third decile of firms whose
earnings exceed the zero value earnings benchmark. Negative
values are expected when impairment is indicated.

PYBin1 =

Zero/one indicator variable indicating that the firm’s earnings
(before writedown) are within the first decile of firms whose
earnings exceed the prior-year earnings benchmark. Negative
values are expected when impairment is indicated.

PYBin2 =

Zero/one indicator variable indicating that the firm’s earnings
(before writedown) are within the second decile of firms whose
earnings exceed the prior-year earnings benchmark. Negative
values are expected when impairment is indicated.
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PYBin3 =

Zero/one indicator variable indicating that the firm’s earnings
(before writedown) are within the third decile of firms whose
earnings exceed the prior-year earnings benchmark. Negative
values are expected when impairment is indicated.

As discussed for hypotheses 1 through 3, hypotheses 5 through 7 are supported if
the firms of interest have a negative slope for the treatment variables. This result
demonstrates that goodwill impairment writedowns are being understated. In addition,
the relationship between the dependent variable, ImpairFlag, and the first decile bin will
be more negative than the relationship between ImpairFlag and the second decile bin.
This finding illustrates that goodwill impairment writedowns are being more understated
within the first decile beyond the key earnings benchmark than in the second decile
beyond the key earnings benchmark. Likewise, the relationship between the dependent
variable, ImpairFlag, and the second decile bin will be more negative than the
relationship between ImpairFlag and the third decile bin. This result suggests that
goodwill impairment writedowns are being more understated within the second decile
beyond the key earnings benchmark than in the third decile beyond the key earnings
benchmark.
Formally stated, the fourth group of logistic research hypotheses is as follows:
H8(a): Firms that have greater positive prewritedown earnings will have larger
writedowns than firms with small positive earnings.
A positive slope for EPS supports this hypothesis, suggesting that firms with
greater earnings are more likely to be those firms with larger goodwill impairment
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writedowns. This result indicates that goodwill impairment writedowns are being
understated by firms with smaller, but positive, earnings.
H8(b): As earnings for firms become very large, writedowns will become
smaller and smaller.
A negative coefficient for EPSSqrd supports this hypothesis, reflecting
diminishing marginal returns and demonstrating that large goodwill impairment
writedowns are not typically needed for very successful firms.
The logistic model to test the above hypotheses is as follows:
ImpairFlag i = β 0 + β1 EPSi + β 2 EPSSqrdi + β x Controlsi + ε i (14)

Where:
EPS =

Variable indicating the earnings per share (before writedown) for
all positive earnings firms. Positive values are expected.

EPSSqrd =

Variable indicating the earnings per share (before writedown)
squared for all positive earnings firms. Negative values are
expected.

Control Variables
The Francis et al. (1996) study included several exogenous variables to indicate
the presence of an expected impairment loss. These exogenous variables have been
adapted as the control variables in this study: past stock price performance, book-tomarket ratios, return-on-assets, historical propensity to take write-offs, change in
management, and size of firm. The control variables are described and the expected
signs of the coefficients are given in Table 1.
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The firm’s historical stock price performance is measured both as the marketadjusted (that is, firm less the market return) stock price performance over the year
preceding the year of the write-off (Ret1) and over the period beginning five years and
ending one year prior to the year of the write-off (Ret5). Since the likelihood of
impairment increases as the firm’s past stock price performance declines, negative values
for these returns are expected when impairment is indicated.
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Table 1
Control Variables and Predicted Signs
Variable
Name
Ret1

Predicted
Sign
-

Ret5

-

BTM

+

ΔBTM

+

ΔIndBTM

+

ΔROA

-

ΔIndROA

-

WOffHist

+

IndWOffHist

+

ΔMgmt

+

Size

+/-

Variable Description
Stock price performance over the year (250 trading days)
preceding the year of the write-off.
Stock price performance over the period beginning five years and
ending one year prior to the year of the write-off.
Industry-adjusted (that is, firm less the industry median) book-tomarket ratio measured as of the fiscal year-end preceding the
write-off.
The mean change in the firm’s book-to-market ratio measured
over the five years preceding the write-off year.
The average change in the median book-to-market ratio of all
firms in the same four-digit SIC code as the firm measured over
the five years preceding the write-off year.
The mean change in the firm’s return-on-assets over the five
years preceding the write-off year.
The average change in the return-on-assets of all firms in the
same four-digit SIC code as the firm measured over the previous
five years prior to the write-off year.
The number of years the firm reported negative special items in
the previous five years.
The average number of years of all firms in the same four-digit
SIC code as the firm reported negative special items in the
previous five years.
Zero/one indicator variable indicating a change in the firm’s top
officers (chairman of the board, president, or chief executive
officer) during the current or preceding accounting year.
A control variable defined as the log of sales of the year prior to
the write-off year.

The book-to-market ratios are industry-adjusted (that is, firm less the industry
median) and are measured as of the fiscal year-end preceding year of the write-off
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(BTM). The first of the historical book-to-market ratios is calculated as the mean change
in a firm’s book-to-market ratio during the five year period preceding the write-off
(ΔBTM). The second of the historical book-to-market ratios is calculated as the mean
change in a firm’s industry book-to-market ratio (ΔIndBTM) over the five year period
preceding the write-off. Positive values for the book-to-market ratios are expected when
impairment is indicated since book-to-market ratios that are increasing or are higher than
the industry average are indicative of impaired assets.
The past performance of a firm and its industry are measured using the mean
change in the firm’s return-on-assets (ΔROA) and the mean change in the return-onassets of all firms in the same four-digit SIC code as the firm (ΔIndROA). The changes
are measured over the five years prior to the write-off and would be expected to decline
when assets become impaired. Therefore, negative values for these variables are
predicted when impairment is indicated.
There is an increased likelihood of a write-off when a firm has a history of writeoffs per Elliott and Hanna (1996). Therefore, the history of reporting negative special
items over the last five years is measured by the number of write-off years for that firm
(WOffHist) and by the average number of write-off years of all firms in the same fourdigit SIC code (IndWOffHist). Positive (i.e., greater than zero) values are expected for
these when impairment is indicated.
The proxy for a change in management (ΔMgmt) is a zero/one indicator variable
reflecting a change in the firm’s top officers (chairman of the board, president, or chief
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executive officer) during the current or preceding accounting year. The propensity to
take large write-offs by the new upper management in the year of the turnover has been
documented by research (Porciau, 1993). Incentives for these write-offs include:
•

large losses taken to improve the future perceptions of earnings by the new
management team,

•

the close scrutiny by a new management team may reveal previously
unrecognized asset impairments, and

•

the change in strategic focus by the new management team may render some
assets useless or less valued (Francis et al., 1996).
The size (Size) of the firm is defined as the log of sales of the year prior to the

write-off.

Data Sources
This paper tests the goodwill impairment writedowns taken for the year 2002, the
first year following the effective date (post December 2001) of the new goodwill
standard. The data are from the Compustat database with the exception of the stock
return data, which are taken from the CRSP database. Testing is conducted by
comparing net income before and after goodwill impairment writedowns with the first
two thresholds mentioned earlier: first, positive earnings per share and, second, previous
period’s earnings.
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Summary
In summary, the overall research hypothesis tests agency theory by looking at the
discretionary behavior of managers under the new accounting rule for goodwill
impairment writedowns. Stated informally, the overall hypothesis is that the goodwill
impairment provisions have been utilized as a tool for earnings management. This paper
tests for earnings management in the first year following the effective date for the new
guideline. A variation of the cross-sectional distributional tests is conducted around the
zero earnings and the prior-year earnings benchmarks to test for the presence of earnings
management. The test utilizes tobit and logistic regression models. The dependent
variables in these models represent goodwill impairment taken. The variables of interest
in these models, loosely described, represent the firms that just barely meet or beat the
earnings benchmarks. Control variables are those that have been determined in prior
research (Francis et al., 1996) to indicate the need for asset impairment writedowns.
Results from these regressions are discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Introduction
This chapter presents the results from the data analyses performed to test the
hypotheses developed in Chapter 3. First, the data set is discussed, including descriptive
statistics for the companies included in the sample. Next, the data are subjected to both
tobit and logistic regressions. The results of the tobit regressions (equations 1 through 7),
which are used to test the first set of four hypotheses, are presented. Then, the findings
of the logistics regressions (equations 8 through 14), which test the second set of four
hypotheses, are reported. Finally, the chapter concludes with an overview of the control
variables’ effects in the various models.
Tables 2 and 3 repeat the variable definitions as presented in chapter 3. As noted
in the previous descriptions, all references to earnings in Table 2 are pre-writedown
values.
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Table 2
Dependent and Treatment Variables Descriptions
Variable
Name
Goodwill
ImpairFlag
ManipZero
ManipPY
Z2$
PY2$
ZeroBin1
ZeroBin2
ZeroBin3
PYBin1
PYBin2
PYBin3
EPS
EPSSqrd

Variable Description
Dependent variable in each tobit model. Amount of goodwill
impairment taken (scaled by number of outstanding shares).
Dependent variable in each logistic model. Indicator variable
where 0 indicates a firm with a small writedown and 1 indicates a
firm with a large writedown.
Zero/one indicator variable indicating that the firm’s earnings are
within the first decile of firms whose earnings exceed the zero
value earnings benchmark.
Zero/one indicator variable indicating that the firm’s earnings are
within the first decile of firms whose earnings exceed the prioryear earnings benchmark.
Variable indicating the firms whose earnings exceed the zero
value earnings benchmark and that range up to two dollars.
Variable indicating the firms whose earnings exceed the prioryear earnings benchmark and that range up to two dollars above
prior-year earnings.
Zero/one indicator variable indicating that the firm’s earnings are
within the first, second or third decile, respectively, of firms
whose earnings exceed the zero value earnings benchmark.
Zero/one indicator variable indicating that the firm’s earnings are
within the first, second or third decile, respectively, of firms
whose earnings exceed the prior-year earnings benchmark.
Variable indicating the earnings per share for all positive earnings
firms.
Variable indicating the earnings per share squared for all positive
earnings firms.
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Table 3
Control Variables and Predicted Signs
Variable
Name
Ret1

Predicted
Sign
-

Ret5

-

BTM

+

ΔBTM

+

ΔIndBTM

+

ΔROA

-

ΔIndROA

-

WOffHist

+

IndWOffHist

+

ΔMgmt

+
+/-

Size

Variable Description
Stock price performance over the year (250 trading days)
preceding the year of the write-off.
Stock price performance over the period beginning five years and
ending one year prior to the year of the write-off.
Industry-adjusted (that is, firm less the industry median) book-tomarket ratio measured as of the fiscal year-end preceding the
write-off.
The mean change in the firm’s book-to-market ratio measured
over the five years preceding the write-off year.
The average change in the median book-to-market ratio of all
firms in the same four-digit SIC code as the firm measured over
the five years preceding the write-off year.
The mean change in the firm’s return-on-assets over the five
years preceding the write-off year.
The average change in the return-on-assets of all firms in the
same four-digit SIC code as the firm measured over the previous
five years prior to the write-off year.
The number of years the firm reported negative special items in
the previous five years.
The average number of years of all firms in the same four-digit
SIC code as the firm reported negative special items in the
previous five years.
Zero/one indicator variable indicating a change in the firm’s top
officers (chairman of the board, president, or chief executive
officer) during the current or preceding accounting year.
A control variable defined as the log of sales of the year prior to
the write-off year.

Data Set
Composition of the final sample is detailed in Table 4. The initial sample consists
of all 10,350 firms in the active Compustat database. The sample is reduced by 7,869
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firms from eliminating missing observations and firms in the financial (SIC Codes 60006999) and utilities (SIC Codes 4000-4999) industries. These two industries are highly
regulated and therefore are dropped as managers in these industries are not considered to
have the same judgmental latitude as managers in other industries. A total of 1,008
negative earnings firms are also eliminated from the sample. Negative earnings firms are
removed because as described in the previous chapter the hypotheses in this study deal
only with positive earnings firms. The final sample available to test the first benchmark,
zero earnings, consists of 1,473 positive earnings firms, 56 goodwill writedown firms24
and 1,417 non-writedown firms. A total of 408 firms that did not meet or exceed prioryear earnings were eliminated from the sample for the second benchmark, prior period
earnings, leaving 1,065 firms for examining that benchmark. These 1,065 firms in the
final sample available for the second benchmark were comprised of 45 goodwill
writedown and 1,020 non-writedown firms.

24

A reminder: Firms were required to perform an initial evaluation test during the first three months in the
first year for which the guideline became effective, 2002. Adjustments based upon the initial evaluation
are shown below the line for “continuing operations.” These adjustments are not included in this data set.
This sample is composed of entries from the second evaluation test conducted during 2002, which is the
first annual evaluation. These annual adjustments are included in “net income from continuing
operations.” Since this is the second time available to managers to manage earnings via their discretion in
goodwill writedowns, an argument might be presented that these numbers are less likely to find significant
results.
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Table 4
Sample Composition

Zero Earnings
Benchmark
Firms in original sample

Prior-Year Earnings
Benchmark

10,350

10,350

Less: Firms in financial and utilities
industries and with missing
observations

7,869

7,869

Less: Negative earnings firms

1,008

1,008

n/a

408

Final Sample

1,473

1,065

Final Sample Composition
Goodwill writedown firms
Non-writedown firms

56
1,417

45
1,020

Less: Firms that did not meet or exceed
prior years’ earnings

Descriptive statistics are given in Table 5. Table 5 Panel A presents the
descriptive statistics for the sample testing the first benchmark analysis, zero earnings.
Likewise, Table 5 Panel B presents the descriptive statistics for the sample used to
examine the second benchmark analysis, prior-year earnings. Each of these panels is
broken down by writedown firms and non-writedown firms. The number of sample
observations, the mean values, medians, standard deviations, minimums, and maximums
for the treatment and control variables are presented. Similarities can be seen in the
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variable statistic values between both writedown and non-writedown firms in the two
benchmarks as well as between both benchmarks.
Table 5
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Zero Earnings Benchmark Firms
Goodwill Writedown Firms
N=56
Variable

Goodwill
ImpairFlag
Ret1
Ret5
BTM
ΔBTM
ΔIndBTM
ΔROA
ΔIndROA
WOffHist
IndWOffHist
Size
ΔMgmt
ManipZero
Z2$
ZeroBin1
ZeroBin2
ZeroBin3
EPS
EPSSqrd

Mean Median Std Dev
0.18
0.07
0.30
0.59
1.00
0.50
0.06
0.07
-0.02
-1.56
-0.27
94.79
63.96
2.36

Non-Writedown Firms
N=1417

Min
0.00
0.00

Max
1.51
1.00

Mean
0.00
0.00

0.50

-0.48

2.79

-0.17
0.88
-0.11
0.54
0.02 10.50
-0.13
4.68
1.14 662.21
1.86 189.36
2.50
1.29

-0.99
-1.15
-71.88
-20.49
-7.07
-60.41
0.00

3.45
2.26
12.51
12.69
4960.36
777.16
5.00

-0.03

Median
0.00
0.00

Std Dev
0.00
0.00

Min
0.00
0.00

Max
0.00
0.00

0.10

0.03

0.51

-0.97

6.03

0.11
0.14
-2.19
-0.97
40.18
25.01
2.07

-0.22
0.00
0.01
-0.09
1.22
1.47
2.00

1.48
1.08
90.89
22.85
773.15
979.93
1.27

-1.75
-10.32
-3166.20
-226.26
-281.01
-22684.47
0.00

21.09
21.12
1164.02
304.17
27960.96
27960.96
5.00

2.09
7.26
0.54

2.14
7.54
1.00

0.39
2.04
0.50

1.20
2.25
0.00

3.00
11.28
1.00

2.09
6.00
0.50

2.09
5.98
1.00

0.44
1.94
0.50

0.33
1.16
0.00

4.33
12.07
1.00

0.02
0.71
0.02
0.05
0.07
1.66
4.61

0.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.47
2.17

0.13
0.46
0.13
0.23
0.26
1.38
7.67

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.08
0.01

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
6.18
38.15

0.09
0.83
0.09
0.10
0.11
1.19
3.28

0.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.88
0.77

0.29
0.38
0.29
0.30
0.31
1.37
17.14

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
513.02
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Table 5 (continued)
Panel B: Prior-Year Earnings Benchmark Firms
Goodwill Writedown Firms
N=45
Variable

Goodwill
ImpairFlag
Ret1
Ret5
BTM
ΔBTM
ΔIndBTM
ΔROA
ΔIndROA
WOffHist
IndWOffHist
Size
ΔMgmt
ManipPY
PY2$
PYBin1
PYBin2
PYBin3
EPS
EPSSqrd

Mean Median Std Dev
0.20
0.08
0.31
0.62
1.00
0.49
0.11
0.14
0.01
-0.64
0.23
117.49
76.86
2.44

Non-Writedown Firms
N=1020

Min
0.00
0.00

Max
1.51
1.00

Mean
0.00
0.00

0.54

0.47

2.79

0.17

0.09

0.56

-0.10
0.95
-0.11
0.59
0.02
4.43
-0.09
4.08
1.10 738.56
2.83 209.19
3.00
1.25

-0.99
-1.15
-26.67
-11.92
-7.07
-60.41
0.00

3.45
2.26
7.19
12.69
4960.36
777.16
5.00

0.18
0.14
-3.06
-1.12
49.01
28.33
2.14

-0.22
0.00
0.01
-0.09
0.97
1.47
2.00

1.64
1.14
107.06
24.83
901.50
1148.82
1.27

0.03

Median
0.00
0.00

Std Dev
0.00
0.00

Min
0.00
0.00

Max
0.00
0.00

-0.97

6.03

-1.75
21.09
-10.32
21.12
-3166.20 1164.02
-226.26
304.17
-187.41 27960.96
-22684.47 27960.96
0.00
5.00

2.09
7.46
0.53

2.14
7.56
1.00

0.38
1.80
0.50

1.20
3.47
0.00

3.00
11.28
1.00

2.11
5.99
0.52

2.10
5.99
1.00

0.44
1.93
0.50

0.33
1.38
0.00

4.33
12.07
1.00

0.02
0.87

0.00
1.00

0.15
0.34

0.00
0.00

1.00
1.00

0.10
0.90

0.00
1.00

0.30
0.30

0.00
0.00

1.00
1.00

0.02

0.00

0.15

0.00

1.00

0.10

0.00

0.30

0.00

1.00

0.02

0.00

0.15

0.00

1.00

0.11

0.00

0.31

0.00

1.00

0.04

0.00

0.21

0.00

1.00

0.11

0.00

0.30

0.00

1.00

1.79

1.65

1.28

0.36

6.18

1.27

0.99

1.23

0.01

11.99

4.79

2.72

7.03

0.13

38.15

3.12

0.98

8.26

0.00

143.76

Results
This research utilizes two sets of regressions to provide evidence regarding
whether the discretion allowed in the new goodwill guideline has been used for
opportunistic earnings management. The first set is examined with tobit regressions.
The second set consists of logistic regressions. Three versions of each model are run.
The three versions will be referred to as Model 1, Model 2, and Model 3, respectively, for
each equation. Model 1 is a full model that includes all control variables discussed in
Chapter 3. Note that in Model 1, every variable that is controlled by industry is also
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represented without the industry control. For instance, the industry control variable for
Change in Return on Assets (ΔIndROA) is in addition to the control variable for Change
in Return on Assets that is not industry controlled (ΔROA). Then, in Model 2, the
industry controls are excluded because of concern that including both the industry
controlled and the non-industry controlled variables in the same model could potentially
cause some noise in the results. Model 3 only includes one control variable, Size. Due to
the significance of Size in the first two models, Model 3 is estimated to determine the
impact on the treatment variables if only the Size variable is included.25

Tobit Results
Goodwill is the dependent variable in each of the tobit regressions. As previously
discussed, Goodwill represents the amount of impairment loss (scaled by number of
outstanding shares) taken by a firm.
Table 6 presents the results of the tobit model for Equation 1, which is for
hypothesis H1(a). As discussed earlier, Equation 1 measures the extent of incentive to
manipulate earnings created by the proximity of pre-writedown earnings relative to the
zero earnings benchmark. ManipZero indicates whether the firm’s earnings are within
the first decile of firms whose earnings exceed the zero value earnings benchmark. The
ManipZero treatment variable is marginally significant for all three models (p-values of
0.1156 for Model 1, 0.1095 for Model 2, and 0.1212 for Model 3). This variable also has

25

Tests on the data revealed no problems with multicollinearity.
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the negative sign expected. These results suggest that managers are exploiting their
discretion in recognizing goodwill impairment losses to manage earnings to exceed the
zero value earnings benchmark.
Equation 2’s tobit results, which are for hypothesis H1(b), are given in Table 7.
Equation 2 examines the incentive to manage earnings relative to the proximity of prewritedown earnings to the prior- year earnings benchmark. ManipPY indicates whether
the firm’s earnings are within the first decile of firms whose earnings exceed the prioryear earnings benchmark. ManipPY is negative and significant for all three models (pvalues of 0.0738 for Model 1, 0.0741 for Model 2, and 0.0726 for Model 3). These
results provide evidence that managers are using the latitude available in recognizing
goodwill impairment losses to manage earnings to exceed the prior-year earnings
benchmark.
Tables 8 and 9 report the results of the tobit models for Equations 3 and 4, which
are for H2(a) and H2(b), respectively. Equations 3 and 4 also test the incentive to
manipulate earnings created by the proximity of pre-writedown earnings relative to the
earnings benchmarks, using an arbitrary measure of two dollars as a measure of small
earnings. Z2$ and PY2$ are zero/one indicator variables representing the firms whose
earnings exceed the zero value earnings benchmark and the prior-year earnings
benchmark, respectively, by up to two dollars. Contrary to expectations, neither the Z2$
nor the PY2$ treatment variable is significant. As such, results for these models are not
interpreted.
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The tobit model results for Equation 5, which are for H3(a), H3(b), and H3(c),
are provided in Table 10. Equation 5 tests for earnings management using variables
representing the three positive deciles closest to the zero value earnings benchmark.
These variables are zero/one indicator variables. ZeroBin1, ZeroBin2, and ZeroBin3
denote that the firm’s earnings are within each of the first three deciles of firms whose
earnings exceed the zero value earnings benchmark. While all the treatment variables
carry the expected negative sign, only the ZeroBin1 treatment variable is significant for
all three models (p-values of 0.0956 for Model 1, 0.0907 for Model 2, and 0.1055 for
Model 3). None of the models provided significant results for the ZeroBin2 and
ZeroBin3 treatment variables. These findings, showing significance for ZeroBin1 only,
suggest that managers are managing earnings through goodwill impairment losses so that
current earnings exceed the zero value earnings benchmark when initial earnings are very
close to the zero benchmark. However, as reported positive earnings move farther away
from the zero earnings benchmark (for ZeroBin2 or ZeroBin3), the model results are
insignificant, implying the absence of earnings management behaviors in these bins.
Table 11 reveals the results of the tobit model for Equation 6, which examines
H3(d), H3(e), and H3(f). Equation 6, similar to Equation 5, tests for earnings
management using zero/one indicator variables that represent the three positive deciles
closest to the prior-year earnings benchmark. PYBin1, PYBin2, and PYBin3 are
variables representing firms within the first three deciles of firms whose earnings exceed
the prior-year earnings benchmark. The PYBin1 and PYBin2 treatment variables are

76

significant and negative as expected for all three models (for PYBin1 p-values of 0.0551
for Model 1, 0.0550 for Model 2, and 0.0558 for Model 3 and for PYBin2 p-values of
0.0644 for Model 1, 0.0672 for Model 2, and 0.0669 for Model 3). However, as shown
in the table, the PYBin3 treatment variable is not significant in any of the models. These
results suggest that managers of companies with reported earnings very close to the prioryear earnings benchmark are exploiting their discretion in recognizing goodwill
impairment losses to manage earnings to exceed the prior-year earnings benchmark.
The results of Equation 7’s tobit model, which tests hypotheses H4(a) and H4(b),
are furnished in Table 12. Equation 7 measures the relationship of goodwill impairment
to earnings per share. EPS is the earnings per share for all positive earnings firms.
EPSSqrd is a variable indicating the earnings per share squared for all positive earnings
firms. The EPS treatment variable is marginally significant for all models (p-values of
0.1031 for Model 1, 0.1029 for Model 2, and 0.1255 for Model 3). This variable has the
expected positive sign, suggesting that goodwill impairment writedowns are being
understated by firms with smaller, but positive, earnings. However, the EPSSqrd
treatment variable is not significant in any of the models. Therefore, the results suggest
that the EPSSqrd treatment variable does not provide any explanatory value for
determining earnings management behavior.
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Table 6
H1(a) – Equation 1
Goodwilli = β 0 + β1ManipZeroi + β x Controlsi + ε i
Model 1
Coefficient
(Std. error)
-1.3310 ***
(0.2393)

Model 2
Coefficient
(Std. error)
-1.3937 ***
(0.2036)

Model 3
Coefficient
(Std. error)
-1.3868 ***
(0.1962)

ManipZero

-0.2394 *
(0.1999)

-0.2464 *
(0.2004)

-0.2298 *
(0.1965)

Ret1

-0.0091
(0.0759)

-0.0080
(0.0751)

Ret5

-0.0114
(0.0301)

-0.0112
(0.0300)

BTM

-0.0166
(0.0389)

-0.0169
(0.0385)

ΔBTM

-0.0001
(0.0005)

0.0000
(0.0005)

ΔIndBTM

0.0005
(0.0018)

ΔROA

0.0000
(0.0001)

ΔIndROA

0.0000
(0.0001)

WOffHist

0.0186
(0.0279)

IndWOffHist

-0.0367
(0.0793)

Size

0.0685 ***
(0.0190)

0.0677 ***
(0.0189)

ΔMgmt

0.0118
(0.0647)

0.0124
(0.0646)

0.1156

0.1095

Variable
Intercept

p-value
ManipZero

0.0000
0.0000

0.0147
(0.0263)

0.0720 ***
(0.0183)

0.1212

*** p ≤ 5 percent; ** 5 percent < p ≤ 10 percent; * 10 percent < p ≤ to 15 percent
Note: one-tailed significance.
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Table 7
H1(b) – Equation 2
Goodwilli = β 0 + β1ManipPYi + β x Controlsi + ε i

Variable
Intercept

Model 1
Coefficient
(Std. error)
-1.4774
(0.3005)

***

Model 3
Coefficient
(Std. error)
-1.5779 ***
(0.2481)

-0.3172 **
(0.2193)

-0.3168 **
(0.2174)

ManipPY

-0.3190
(0.2203)

Ret1

0.0013
(0.0840)

0.0019
(0.0829)

Ret5

-0.0093
(0.0333)

-0.0085
(0.0330)

BTM

-0.0051
(0.0424)

-0.0057
(0.0418)

ΔBTM

0.0000
(0.0009)

0.0001
(0.0008)

ΔIndBTM

0.0100
(0.0022)

ΔROA

0.0000
(0.0001)

ΔIndROA

0.0000
(0.0001)

WOffHist

0.0110
(0.0337)

IndWOffHist

-0.0550
(0.0950)

Size

0.0974
(0.0247)

ΔMgmt

-0.0132
(0.0781)

-0.0097
(0.0778)

0.0738

0.0741

p-value
ManipPY

**

Model 2
Coefficient
(Std. error)
-1.5762 ***
(0.2597)

0.0000
0.0000

0.0055
(0.0318)

***

0.0967 ***
(0.0246)

0.0979 ***
(0.0237)

0.0726

*** p ≤ 5 percent; ** 5 percent < p ≤ 10 percent; * 10 percent < p ≤ to 15 percent
Note: one-tailed significance.
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Table 8
H2(a) – Equation 3
Goodwilli = β 0 + β1Z2$i + β x Controlsi + ε i

Variable
Intercept
Z2$
Ret1
Ret5
BTM
ΔBTM
ΔIndBTM
ΔROA
ΔIndROA
WOffHist
IndWOffHist
Size
ΔMgmt

p-value
Z2$

Model 1
Coefficient
(Std. error)
-1.2737 ***
(0.2534)
-0.0734
(0.0791)
-0.0038
(0.0749)
-0.0089
(0.0296)
-0.0165
(0.0390)
-0.0001
(0.0005)
0.0005
(0.0018)
0.0000
(0.0001)
0.0000
(0.0001)
0.0207
(0.0280)
-0.0450
(0.0788)
0.0685 ***
(0.0195)
0.0150
(0.0646)

Model 2
Coefficient
(Std. error)
-1.3519 ***
(0.2200)
-0.0735
(0.0788)
-0.0021
(0.0739)
-0.0085
(0.0295)
-0.0167
(0.0385)
0.0000
(0.0005)

Model 3
Coefficient
(Std. error)
-1.3455 ***
(0.2154)
-0.0658
(0.0772)

0.0000
(0.0000)

0.0157
(0.0263)

0.0678 ***
(0.0194)
0.0156
(0.0645)

0.1768

0.1756

*** p ≤ 5 percent; ** 5 percent < p ≤ 10 percent; * 10 percent < p ≤ to 15 percent
Note: one-tailed significance.
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0.0721 ***
(0.0187)

0.1969

Table 9
H2(b) – Equation 4
Goodwilli = β 0 + β1 PY2$i + β x Controlsi + ε i

Variable
Intercept

Model 1
Coefficient
(Std. error)
-1.4297 ***
(0.3231)

Model 2
Coefficient
(Std. error)
-1.5401 ***
(0.2849)

PY2$

-0.0823
(0.1202)

-0.0799
(0.1198)

Ret1

0.0089
(0.0831)

0.0098
(0.0819)

Ret5

-0.0045
(0.0325)

-0.0037
(0.0322)

BTM

-0.0061
(0.0434)

-0.0064
(0.0426)

ΔBTM

0.0000
(0.0009)

0.0001
(0.0008)

ΔIndBTM

0.0008
(0.0021)

ΔROA

0.0000
(0.0001)

ΔIndROA

0.0000
(0.0001)

WOffHist

0.0141
(0.0338)

IndWOffHist

-0.0608
(0.0949)

Size

0.0988 ***
(0.0247)

0.0980 ***
(0.0245)

ΔMgmt

-0.0182
(0.0784)

-0.0152
(0.0781)

0.2469

0.2525

p-value
PY2$

Model 3
Coefficient
(Std. error)
-1.5325 ***
(0.2689)
-0.0816
(0.1175)

0.0000
(0.0000)

0.0079
(0.0319)

*** p ≤ 5 percent; ** 5 percent < p ≤ 10 percent; * 10 percent < p ≤ to 15 percent
Note: one-tailed significance.
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0.0988 ***
(0.0236)

0.2438

Table 10
H3(a), H3(b), and H3(c) – Equation 5
Goodwilli = β 0 + β1ZeroBin1i + β 2 ZeroBin2i + β 3 ZeroBin3i + β x Controlsi + ε i

Variable
Intercept

Model 1
Coefficient
(Std. error)

Model 2
Coefficient
(Std. error)

-1.2792 ***

-1.3452 ***

(0.2443)

ZeroBin1

(0.2086)

-0.2650 **

-0.2717 **

(0.2027)

ZeroBin2
ZeroBin3
Ret1
Ret5
BTM
ΔBTM
ΔIndBTM

(0.2033)

Model 3
Coefficient
(Std. error)
-1.3469 ***
(0.2005)
-0.2479 *
(0.1981)

-0.0856

-0.0845

-0.0725

(0.1361)

(0.1356)

(0.1321)

-0.0647

-0.0627

-0.0591

(0.1223)

(0.1221)

(0.1218)

-0.0166

-0.0151

(0.0773)

(0.0764)

-0.0147

-0.0144

(0.0308)

(0.0307)

-0.0144

-0.0148

(0.0395)

(0.0392)

-0.0001

0.0000

(0.0005)

(0.0005)

0.0005
(0.0018)

ΔROA
ΔIndROA

0.0000

0.0000

(0.0001)

(0.0000)

0.0000
(0.0001)

WOffHist
IndWOffHist

0.0186

0.0146

(0.0279)

(0.0263)

-0.0381
(0.0792)

Size

0.0636 ***

0.0629 ***

(0.0198)

ΔMgmt

(0.0197)

0.0116

0.0123

(0.0646)

(0.0645)

p-values
ZeroBin1
0.0956
0.0907
ZeroBin2
0.2647
0.2666
ZeroBin3
0.2986
0.3038
*** p ≤ 5 percent; ** 5 percent < p ≤ 10 percent; * 10 percent < p ≤ to 15 percent
Note: one-tailed significance.
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0.0680 ***
(0.0190)

0.1055
0.2916
0.3138

Table 11
H3(d), H3(e), and H3(f) – Equation 6
Goodwilli = β 0 + β1 PYBin1i + β 2 PYBin2i + β 3 PYBin3i + β x Controlsi + ε i

Variable
Intercept

Model 1
Coefficient
(Std. error)

Model 2
Coefficient
(Std. error)

-1.3694 ***

-1.4946 ***

(0.2988)

PYBin1

(0.2561)

-0.3535 **

-0.3519 **

(0.2212)

PYBin2

(0.2202)

-0.3271 **

-0.3165 **

(0.2153)

PYBin3
Ret1
Ret5
BTM
ΔBTM
ΔIndBTM

(0.2113)

Model 3
Coefficient
(Std. error)
-1.5126 ***
(0.2447)
-0.3472 **
(0.2182)
-0.3167 **
(0.2113)

-0.1531

-0.1511

-0.1509

(0.1645)

(0.1632)

(0.1623)

-0.0115

-0.0106

(0.0854)

(0.0841)

-0.0084

-0.0072

(0.0333)

(0.0330)

-0.0065

-0.0069

(0.0425)

(0.0418)

0.0000

0.0001

(0.0008)

(0.0007)

0.0001
(0.0022)

ΔROA
ΔIndROA

0.0008

0.0000

(0.0001)

(0.0000)

0.0000
(0.0001)

WOffHist
IndWOffHist

0.0070

-0.0001

(0.0341)

(0.0322)

-0.0695
(0.0966)

Size

0.0295 ***

0.0917 ***

(0.0249)

ΔMgmt

(0.0247)

-0.0147

-0.0110

(0.0790)

(0.0785)

p-values
PYBin1
0.0551
0.0550
PYBin2
0.0644
0.0672
PYBin3
0.1759
0.1773
*** p ≤ 5 percent; ** 5 percent < p ≤ 10 percent; * 10 percent < p ≤ to 15 percent
Note: one-tailed significance.
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0.0929 ***
(0.0238)

0.0558
0.0669
0.1762

Table 12
H4(a) and H4(b) – Equation 7
Goodwilli = β 0 + β1 EPSi + β 2 EPSSqrdi + β x Controlsi + ε i

Variable
Intercept
EPS
EPSSqrd
Ret1
Ret5
BTM
ΔBTM
ΔIndBTM
ΔROA
ΔIndROA
WOffHist
IndWOffHist
Size
ΔMgmt
p-values
EPS
EPSSqrd

Model 1
Coefficient
(Std. error)
-1.3498 ***
(0.2383)
0.0813 *
(0.0643)
-0.0078
(0.0098)
-0.0138
(0.0770)
-0.0143
(0.0311)
-0.0144
(0.0393)
-0.0001
(0.0005)
0.0005
(0.0018)
0.0000
(0.0001)
0.0000
(0.0001)
0.0220
(0.0280)
-0.0434
(0.0783)
0.0586
(0.0210)
0.0129
(0.0642)

Model 2
Coefficient
(Std. error)
-1.4253 ***
(0.2031)
0.0811
(0.0641)
-0.0078
(0.0097)
-0.0120
(0.0759)
-0.0139
(0.0309)
-0.0147
(0.0389)
0.0000
(0.0005)

0.1031
0.2109

0.1029
0.2118

Model 3
Coefficient
(Std. error)
-1.4143 ***
(0.1960)
0.0705 *
(0.0614)
-0.0068
(0.0095)

0.0000
(0.0000)

0.0173
(0.0263)

0.0579 ***
(0.0209)
0.0136
(0.0641)

*** p ≤ 5 percent; ** 5 percent < p ≤ 10 percent; * 10 percent < p ≤ to 15 percent
Note: one-tailed significance.
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0.0641 ***
(0.0199)

0.1255
0.2374

Logistic Results
The second set of regressions is conducted as tests to see if the robustness of the
tobit results hold with a model specified for logistics. These hypotheses are basically a
repetition of the above tobit regressions, except that ImpairFlag is the dependent
variable. As described in Chapter 3, ImpairFlag is a zero/one indicator variable where 0
represents a company that has taken a small impairment loss and 1 represents a company
that has taken a large impairment loss. As with the tobit regressions, three versions of
each logistic model are run. Model 1 is a full model that includes all the control
variables. Model 2 excludes the industry controls. Model 3 only includes one control
variable, Size.
Equations 8 and 9, the logistic models for Hypotheses H5(a) and H5(b), did not
converge.26 As mentioned above, ManipZero and ManipPY indicate whether the firm’s
earnings are within the first decile of firms whose earnings exceed the zero value
earnings and the prior-year earnings benchmarks, respectively. Since these equations
failed to converge, these results cannot be relied upon nor interpreted.27
26

Each statistical software program has “stopping rules.” For instance, an algorithm may be allowed to
only run as long as one of the statistical values does not go below a preset number. Alternatively, the
algorithm may be allowed to only run a maximum number of times. If the program does not find a
satisfactory solution before stopping, the message will be given that the equation failed to converge. If an
equation fails to converge, then the results given may or may not be the correct solution. Therefore, these
results cannot be relied upon.
27
Since equations 8 and 9, testing Hypotheses H5(a) and H5(b), did not converge, additional testing was
conducted to see at what level significance could be achieved. It was determined that enlarging Bin 1 to
20% (as opposed to the previously tested 10%) gave significant results with p-values of 0.0636, 0.0628,
and 0.0585 for Models 1, 2, and 3 for Equation 8 (H5(a)), respectively. It also resulted in p-values of
0.0519, 0.0519, and 0.0450 for Models 1, 2, and 3 for Equation 9 (H5(b)), respectively. In addition, a test
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The results of the logistic model for Equation 10, which tests hypothesis H6(a),
are presented in Table 13. Equation 10 tests for earnings management using an arbitrary
measure of small earnings, two dollars. Z2$ is a zero/one indicator variable representing
the firms whose earnings exceed the zero value earnings benchmark by up to two dollars.
The Z2$ treatment variable is significant for all three models (p-values of 0.0645 for
Model 1, 0.0620 for Model 2, and 0.0648 for Model 3). This variable also has the
negative sign as expected for all models. These results support the contention that
managers are managing earnings through their discretion in recognizing goodwill
impairment losses so that earnings exceed the zero value earnings.
Equation 11’s logistic model results, which examine hypothesis H6(b), are
disclosed in Table 14. Equation 11 also tests for earnings management using the two
dollar arbitrary measure of small earnings. PY2$ is a zero/one indicator variable
representing the firms whose earnings exceed the prior-year earnings benchmark by up to
two dollars. The PY2$ treatment variable is marginally significant and negative, as
expected, for all three models (p-values of 0.1329 for Model 1, 0.1400 for Model 2, and
0.1142 for Model 3). These results suggest that to exceed the prior-year earnings
benchmark, managers are managing earnings by recognizing goodwill impairment losses
that allow earnings to exceed the prior-year earnings benchmark.

was conducted that eliminated the zero goodwill writedown observations from the small writedown
category, leaving only observations for firms that took goodwill writedowns. This test resulted in p-values
of 0.1129, 0.1205, and 0.0237 for Models 1, 2, and 3 for Equation 8 (H5(a)), respectively. It also resulted
in p-values of 0.1953, 0.2902, and 0.3545 for Models 1, 2, and 3 for Equation 9 (H5(b)), respectively.
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Upon further examination of the data, it has been noted that the two dollar
arbitrary amounts actually represent approximately the lower 82% of the sample
observations. This outcome was unintentional as the two dollar amount was thought to
represent a small earnings, and, thereby, a small number of the total observations.
Additional tests, therefore, were conducted for smaller arbitrary amounts. Table 15
summarizes the results of the various tests. It appears that the results for an arbitrary
$1.50 earnings give slightly better results for both the tobit and the logistic results.
However, the overall picture does not change appreciably with any of the results given.
Tests conducted for the $.50 and $.05 earnings did not converge, and are not reported.
Equation 12, a logistic model testing Hypotheses H7(a), H7(b), and H7(c), did not
converge. As mentioned above, ZeroBin1, ZeroBin2, and ZeroBin3 are variables
indicating that the firm’s earnings are within the first three deciles of firms whose
earnings exceed the zero value earnings benchmark. Since Equation 12 failed to
converge, results from this equation are not reported nor interpreted.
Equation 13, a logistic model testing Hypotheses H7(d), H7(e), and H7(f), also
did not converge. Equation 13 tests for earnings management using the PYBin1,
PYBin2, and PYBin3 variables, which represent firms within the first three deciles of
firms with earnings that exceed the prior-year earnings benchmark. Since Equation 13
failed to converge, results from this equation are not presented and cannot be interpreted.
The results of the logistic model for Equation 14, which examines Hypotheses
H8(a) and H8(b), are given in Table 16. Equation 14 measures the relationship of
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goodwill impairment to earnings per share. EPS is a variable indicating the earnings per
share for all positive earnings firms. EPSSqrd represents the earnings per share squared
for all positive earnings firms. The EPS treatment variable is highly significant and
positive, as expected, for all three models (p-values of 0.0219 for Model 1, 0.0222 for
Model 2, and 0.0258 for Model 3). These results suggest that goodwill impairment
writedowns are being understated by firms with smaller, but positive, earnings. The
EPSSqrd treatment variable is marginally significant for all three models (p-values of
0.1049 for Model 1, 0.1094 for Model 2, and 0.1239 for Model 3). The coefficient for
this variable is negative as expected. These results suggest that large goodwill
impairment writedowns are not typically needed for very successful firms.
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Table 13
H6(a) – Equation 10
ImpairFlagi = β 0 + β1Z2$i + β x Controlsi + ε i

Variable
Intercept
Z2$
Ret1
Ret5
BTM
ΔBTM
ΔIndBTM
ΔROA
ΔIndROA
WOffHist
IndWOffHist
Size
ΔMgmt

p-value
Z2$

Model 1
Coefficient
(Std. error)
-4.9299 ***
(1.1552)
-0.6114 *
(0.4026)
0.3153
(0.3335)
-0.0128
(0.1557)
0.0136
(0.1465)
0.0003
(0.0046)
0.0018
(0.0098)
0.0002
(0.0002)
-0.0001
(0.0002)
0.1286
(0.1533)
-0.3123
(0.4197)
0.2668 ***
(0.1025)
0.2806
(0.3636)

Model 2
Coefficient
(Std. error)
-5.4775 ***
(0.8918)
-0.6166 *
(0.4008)
0.3175
(0.3266)
-0.0053
(0.1524)
0.0075
(0.1442)
0.0003
(0.0043)

0.0645

0.0620

Model 3
Coefficient
(Std. error)
-5.0947 ***
(0.8282)
-0.5974 **
(0.3942)

0.0001
(0.0001)

0.0896
(0.1437)

0.2658 ***
(0.1019)
0.2763
(0.3632)

*** p ≤ 5 percent; ** 5 percent < p ≤ 10 percent; * 10 percent < p ≤ to 15 percent
Note: one-tailed significance.
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0.2659 ***
(0.0952)

0.0648

Table 14
H6(b) – Equation 11
ImpairFlagi = β 0 + β1 PY2$i + β x Controlsi + ε i

Variable
Intercept
PY2$
Ret1
Ret5
BTM
ΔBTM
ΔIndBTM
ΔROA
ΔIndROA
WOffHist
IndWOffHist
Size
ΔMgmt

p-value
PY2$

Model 1
Coefficient
(Std. error)
-4.7893 ***
(1.3094)
-0.5901 *
(0.5302)
0.2101
(0.3607)
0.0137
(0.1453)
0.0362
(0.1491)
0.0001
(0.0040)
0.0024
(0.0103)
0.0002
(0.0002)
-0.0001
(0.0001)
0.1008
(0.1660)
-0.3347
(0.4564)
0.3201 ***
(0.1067)
-0.0352
(0.3938)

Model 2
Coefficient
(Std. error)
-5.3961 ***
(1.0051)
-0.5730 *
(0.5303)
0.2092
(0.3528)
0.0201
(0.1422)
0.0302
(0.1465)
0.0002
(0.0036)

0.1329

0.1400

Model 3
Coefficient
(Std. error)
-5.0939 ***
(0.8751)
-0.6155 *
(0.5110)

0.0001
(0.0001)

0.0624
(0.1575)

0.3177 ***
(0.1063)
-0.0345
(0.3928)

*** p ≤ 5 percent; ** 5 percent < p ≤ 10 percent; * 10 percent < p ≤ to 15 percent
Note: one-tailed significance.

90

0.3049 ***
(0.0990)

0.1142

Table 15
Hypotheses Tests Results – Testing Different Small Earnings Criteria
p-values

Hypothesis
H2(a), H6(a)
H2(b), H6(b)
H2(a), H6(a)
H2(b), H6(b)
H2(a), H6(a)
H2(b), H6(b)

Equation
3,10
4,11
3,10
4,11
3,10
4,11

Earnings
Criteria Variable
$2
$2
$1.50
$1.50
$1.00
$1.00

Z2$
PY2$
Z2$
PY2$
Z2$
PY2$

% of
Observations
82
82
71
71
54
54

Tobit
Logistic
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
0.1768
0.2469
0.0797
0.2459
0.3021
0.2698

0.1756
0.2525
0.0774
0.2480
0.2969
0.2706

0.1969
0.2438
0.0937
0.2362
0.3221
0.2592

0.0645
0.1329
0.0353
0.1262
0.0889
0.1149

0.0620
0.1400
0.0344
0.1273
0.0848
0.1162

0.0648
0.1142
0.0354
0.1032
0.0846
0.0882

Table 16
H8(a) and H8(b) – Equation 14
ImpairFlag i = β 0 + β1 EPSi + β 2 EPSSqrdi + β x Controlsi + ε i

Variable
Intercept

Model 1
Coefficient
(Std. error)

Model 2
Coefficient
(Std. error)

-5.6327 ***

-6.1819 ***

(1.0598)

EPS

(0.7678)

0.6971 ***

0.6881 ***

(0.3456)

EPSSqrd

(0.3423)

-0.0602 *

-0.0584 *

(0.0480)

Ret1
Ret5
BTM
ΔBTM
ΔIndBTM

(0.0475)

0.2697

0.2741

(0.3540)

(0.3468)

-0.0724

-0.0618

(0.1806)

(0.1765)

0.0337

0.0265

(0.1493)

(0.1474)

0.0000

0.0001

(0.0041)

(0.0038)

Model 3
Coefficient
(Std. error)
-5.7923 ***
(0.6911)
0.6442 ***
(0.3309)
-0.0541 *
(0.0468)

0.0019
(0.0095)

ΔROA
ΔIndROA

0.0002

0.0001

(0.0002)

(0.0001)

-0.0001
(0.0002)

WOffHist
IndWOffHist

0.1422

0.1044

(0.1532)

(0.1441)

-0.3073
(0.4160)

Size
ΔMgmt

p-values
EPS
EPSSqrd

0.1749 **

0.1754 **

(0.1142)

(0.1136)

0.2918

0.2883

(0.3641)

(0.3635)

0.0219
0.1049

0.0222
0.1094

*** p ≤ 5 percent; ** 5 percent < p ≤ 10 percent; * 10 percent < p ≤ to 15 percent
Note: one-tailed significance.
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0.1889 ***
(0.1056)

0.0258
0.1239

Control Variables
Control variables are added to regression models to control for effects that may
otherwise drive the results of the regression. As shown in Tables 6 through 18 for both
the tobit and logistic equations, Models 1 and 2 only result in one control variable that
exhibits significance, Size. As a result, Model 3 includes only the Size control variable.
Size remains highly significant and positive in the third model for all equations.

Summary
Results from the hypotheses tests of the data are presented in this chapter. The
chapter covers a description of the data sample, as well as the results of tobit and
regression analyses. In addition, the results are consistent with prior research in finding
that size is a significant control variable. A discussion of the overall implications of the
findings is included in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
Chapter 4 presented test results of the analyses performed on the sample data.
This chapter considers the overall implications of those analyses and draws final
conclusions. The chapter concludes with a discussion of this project’s weaknesses as
well as future research ideas.

Purpose of Study
This study is driven by agency theory. An agency relationship exists when one
party, the principal, engages another party, the agent, to perform services on behalf of the
principal. These services include making decisions on behalf of the principal.
Information asymmetry, however, complicates the relationship. In addition, both parties
in an agency relationship are considered to be motivated by self-interest. As a result, one
of the greatest challenges in an agency relationship is to design an agency contract that
achieves congruence of goals between the principal and agent. These agency contracts
are often tied to financial reporting outcomes.
Due to self-interest, managers therefore have strong motivations to manage
earnings in financial reporting. One response to these motivations is to manage earnings
to exceed key earnings thresholds. The recent modification to the rules for goodwill
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accounting, as set by FASB, eliminates annual amortization charges for goodwill.
Rather, FAS 142 requires annual valuation of business units to determine whether
goodwill is impaired. If impairment does exist, a writedown of goodwill is then
recognized on the income statement. The estimation of goodwill impairment requires
managerial discretion. However, this discretion can also then be used to manage
earnings.
To address the question of whether managers exploit their discretion in
recognizing goodwill impairments to manage earnings, this dissertation examines
evidence regarding financial reporting activity around two key earnings benchmarks,
zero earnings and prior-year earnings. Specifically, this study tests goodwill impairment
writedowns taken for the year 2002 from publicly traded companies, utilizing financial
information obtained from the Compustat and CRSP databases.

Overall Implications and Conclusions
Comparative information for both the tobit and logistic models is presented in
Table 17. This table illustrates that most of the hypotheses are supported by the results of
the tests performed on the sample data. That is, the results of both tobit and logistic
regression models suggest that managers are exploiting their discretion in recognizing
goodwill impairments to manage earnings. The first seven equations, which evaluate
Hypotheses H1 through H4, are tested using tobit models and are discussed first. H1(a)
and H1(b), tested by Equations 1 and 2, are fully supported. These hypotheses test
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whether earnings are managed to exceed the benchmark of zero or prior-year earnings.
These findings hold in the first decile of positive earnings beyond the specified
benchmark. H3(a), H3(b), and H3(c), in Equation 5, are also supported for the decile just
beyond the zero earnings benchmark. Likewise, H3(d), H3(e), and H3(f), in Equation 6,
are supported for the first two deciles beyond the prior-year earnings benchmark. H4(a)
and H4(b), from Equation 7, are supported, suggesting that goodwill impairment
writedowns are being understated by firms with smaller, but positive, earnings. H2(a)
and H2(b), examined by Equations 3 and 4, however, are not supported for the arbitrary
two dollar earnings levels above the zero and prior-year earnings benchmarks.
The second set of equations, which evaluate Hypotheses H5 through H8, was
tested using logistic models. The purpose of including the logistics models was to test
the robustness of the tobit results. While several of the logistics models did not
converge, several models ran successfully. H6(a) and H6(b), tested by Equations 10 and
11, are fully supported by the logistics models. These equations test whether earnings are
managed by an arbitrary two dollar earnings level above the zero and prior-year earnings
benchmarks. These model results are stronger than the tobit results for Equations 3 and
4, for H2(a) and H2(b), which tested these same arbitrary amounts.
H8(a) and H8(b), tested in Equation 14, are also fully supported by the logistics
models. This model tests the relationship between the size of the goodwill impairment
loss taken with both earnings and squared earnings. This test supports the hypothesis that
firms that have greater positive prewritedown earnings will have larger writedowns than
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firms with small positive earnings. It also supports the hypothesis that as earnings for
firms become very large, writedowns will become smaller and smaller, illustrating that
large goodwill impairment writedowns are not typically needed for very successful firms.
These results are stronger than the tobit results for Equation 7, for H4(a) and H4(b),
which also tested this relationship.
All of the logistics models, then, that ran successfully add support to the tobit
results. In summary, the tobit regressions results support the overall hypothesis that
managers are exploiting their discretion in recognizing goodwill impairments to manage
earnings. The logistic regressions results further add robustness to the tobit models.
Finding support for earnings management behavior is especially insightful since the
goodwill writedown tested in this dissertation was the second opportunity for impairment
recognition under the new FASB guideline’s first year. In conclusion, agency theory was
tested in this study by considering whether managers exploit the discretion allowed them
under the new accounting guideline for taking goodwill impairment writedowns. The test
results provide some evidence for the agency theory, indicating that managers are
suspected of exploiting their discretion in recognizing goodwill impairments to manage
earnings.
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Table 17
Hypothesis Tests Results Summary
Hypothesis

Equation Variable

Model 1
Supported
p=0.1156
Supported
p=0.0738

Tobit
Model 2
Supported
p=0.1095
Supported
p=0.0741

Model 3
Supported
p=0.1212
Supported
p=0.0726

Rejected

Rejected

Rejected

Rejected
Supported
p=0.0907

Rejected
Supported
p=0.1055

Model 3

***

***

***

***
Supported
p=0.0645
Supported
p=0.1329

***
Supported
p=0.0620
Supported
p=0.1400

***
Supported
p=0.0648
Supported
p=0.1142

***

***

***

Rejected

***

***

***

Rejected
Supported
p=0.0550
Supported
p=0.0672

Rejected
Supported
p=0.0558
Supported
p=0.0669

***

***

***

***

***

***

***

***

***

Rejected
Supported
p=0.1029

Rejected
Supported
p=0.1255

***
Supported
p=0.0219
EPS
Supported
Rejected
Rejected
Rejected
p=0.1049
EPSSqrd
This model failed to converge. As such, the results cannot be interpreted.

***
Supported
p=0.0222
Supported
p=0.1094

***
Supported
p=0.0258
Supported
p=0.1239

H1(a), H5(a)

1,8

ManipZero

H1(b), H5(b)

2,9

ManipPY

H2(a), H6(a)

3,10

Z2$

H2(a), H6(a)

4,11

PY2$

H3(a), H7(a)

5,12

ZeroBin1

Rejected
Supported
p=0.0956

H3(b), H7(b)

5,12

ZeroBin2

Rejected

Rejected

H3(c), H7(c)

5,12

ZeroBin3

H3(d), H7(d)

6,13

PYBin1

H3(e), H7(e)

6,13

PYBin2

Rejected
Supported
p=0.0551
Supported
p=0.0644

H3(f), H7(f)

6,13

H4(a), H8(a)

7,14

Rejected
Supported
p=0.1031

H4(b), H8(b)

7,14
***

Logistic
Model 2

Model 1

PYBin3

As noted in chapter 4 with the results, the only control variable that was
significant was Size. Perhaps larger firms are subjected to greater levels of scrutiny,
thereby limiting the discretion allowed managers. This scrutiny can take different forms,
resulting in differing levels of restraint placed upon managers. For instance, one of the
restrictions imposed by the audit function is that managers and procedures are critically
observed for compliance with company policies. Publicly available capital market
information places restrictions on the actions of managers, making public much day-today data as well as historical data and activities. Tracking by financial analysts also
provides an additional type of scrutiny, with perhaps increased levels of observation and
collection of financial data and information concerning managerial activity. If larger
firms are subjected to greater levels of scrutiny in these ways, the results for Size suggest
that as the size of a firm increases, greater amounts of scrutiny will result in less of an
opportunity to manage earnings through goodwill impairment values, and thus increased
amounts of goodwill writedown.

Contribution of This Study
This study is important for two reasons. First, the FASB may not have
accomplished what was intended when setting these standards for the new goodwill
impairment rule. The FASB’s primary intent in making the change was to produce
financial statements that would more accurately reflect the underlying economics of the
goodwill asset (FAS 142). However, if the managerial discretion to estimate goodwill
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impairment is being used to manage earnings, the financial statements, both the balance
sheet and the income statement, may be distorted.
Second, this study is important because standard setters need to know which
standards and which accruals are being used to manage earnings. Prevention of earnings
management is needed to further insure comparability of accounting numbers.
Comparability is potentially impaired when greater amounts of managerial estimates are
involved in the preparation of financial statements. As such, the FASB may need to
consider more detailed guidelines. Results from this dissertation further inform this
question, suggesting that managers exploit their discretion in recognizing goodwill
impairments to manage earnings. Thus, this dissertation contributes to the earnings
management literature in that it highlights the immediate exploitation of increased
judgmental latitude for earnings management purposes.

Weaknesses of Study
Several weaknesses are inherent in this study. First, even though the sample
began with the entire active Compustat database of 10,350 firms, the final sample for the
zero earnings benchmark was 1,473 firms, with only 56 of these being writedown firms.
Likewise, the final sample for the prior-year earnings benchmark was 1,065 firms, but
only 45 of those are writedown firms. While the final number of writedown firms is
small, both of these sample sizes exceed the minimum amount to satisfy the central limit
theorem (i.e., 30 observations).
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Second, prior literature widely acknowledges that the Compustat database
contains errors. The extent to which these errors may impact a particular research
project, such as this one, is unknown. However, the sample data is similar both between
writedown firms and non-writedown firms as well as between both benchmark samples.
This similarity gives some assurance that any discrepancies in the data are not likely to
be confined to a particular subsample of the data. Therefore, relying on this data for
testing the hypotheses in this study seems reasonable.
Finally, one of the primary disadvantages of using real-world data (such as that
collected from publicly-traded companies and compiled into the Compustat database) in
any research is whether influences other than those being captured in the analyses may
have impacted the findings. That is, did the variables and controls in this research really
test what was intended or how many extraneous factors exist, but were not included?
This potential disadvantage exists in this research as this dissertation is an archival
empirical research study. However, the large sample sizes used lessen concerns in this
area. Ideally, though, experimental settings could be employed to mitigate this concern.
On the other hand, advantages exist when using real-world data, such as in this
dissertation research. One primary advantage is that by using real-world data, the results
reflect what is actually going on in the business community. Therefore, experimental
methodologies are not necessary for examining the impact in real-world settings, making
this methodology powerful and immediately useful in examining the hypotheses posed in
this dissertation. A second advantage, closely related to the first, is that by using real-
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world data, this study avoids the concern that the subjects in an experiment might be
uninformed or dishonest about what they would do in a given setting. Rather, the data
reflects actions that were taken and there is no need to try to assess the validity of
responses to surveys or to experimental results.

Future Research Opportunities
While the FASB made an excellent attempt at improving financial reporting,
difficulties exist in the implementation of the new goodwill impairment rule. These
difficulties are expected to persist due to the level of discretion allowed managers in
estimating goodwill impairment. Perhaps future research in this area could examine
possible methods of solving this dilemma, so that recommendations can be made for
further regulatory actions from standard setting bodies, such as the FASB.
This research project specifically looked at the first year that the new accounting
guideline for goodwill impairment was effective. Future research could repeat this
analysis for the years following 2002. Examination of the panel data might reveal
additional insights into managerial discretion regarding goodwill writedowns. This
research might, then, further inform standard setting bodies as to the pervasiveness of
earnings management related to the guideline and, thereby, suggest specific approaches
for improved regulation.
The final sample in this research project included only a small number of
goodwill writedown firms. This sample size may have impeded discovery of insights
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that would have been revealed with a larger sample. However, future research could
consider ways to improve this analysis, specifically addressing ways to improve analysis
when the sample size is small.
This dissertation took a critical look at earnings management related to goodwill
writedowns around key earnings benchmarks. However, future research might consider
earnings management from the viewpoint of all firms with goodwill on their balance
sheet. That is, not only from those firms that just barely exceed earnings thresholds.
Some of this type of research is already being conducted. For instance, several earnings
management research papers have been published that take a critical look at firms that
may be using their discretion in the amount of goodwill impairment to take big baths (as
discussed in chapter 2).
A related research idea would be to search for ways to determine if a firm should
have taken a writedown but did not. Most of the firms in the final sample in this
dissertation took no writedown. Since no writedown is an option when managing
earnings, these firms were included in the small writedown category. Future research
might develop a method of closely estimating the number of firms within such a group
that should have taken a writedown.
Future research might also look for ways to explain the positive and significant
relationship between Size and goodwill writedowns. This dissertation has surmised that
this relationship may be due to the increased scrutiny that larger firms experience.
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However, these and other ideas might be researched to see if any insights into this
relationship develop.

Summary
To summarize, even though 2002 is the first year for which the new guideline
for goodwill impairment applies, results from this study suggest that it has already been
seized as an avenue for earnings management. To reiterate, these models’ results suggest
that managers are exploiting their discretion in recognizing goodwill impairments to
manage earnings.
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